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This thesis examines the complexity of the counter-terrorism dynamic from a macro, mid, 
and micro perspective. The goal is to examine this dynamic in three distinct spheres, 
which will better inform the reader of the complexities of combatting terrorism. Chapter 
I, on a macro level, examines the United States as a modern form of Wolfgang 
Schivelbusch’s “Culture of Defeat” born from the collective trauma and consciousness 
that was manifested out of the 9/11 attacks.  This vulnerability allowed for the fallacy that 
was the Global War on Terrorism to be foisted upon an easily manipulated collective 
consciousness with tragic consequences for true U.S. counter-terrorism efforts and the 
public’s psyche. Chapter II, on a mid-level, provides analysis and criticism of current 
American Unmanned Aerial Vehicle policy, tactics, and strategy, and its lack of 
coordination and integration with the larger counter-terrorism strategy. Chapter III, on a 
micro level, explores the threat Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb poses on the Sahel 
region to stability, globalization, and Western interests or efforts within. The research 
finds that terrorism’s influence is far-reaching in its effect on society, policy, and 
technology. It is thus imperative to discover how to adapt, evolve, and create a better 
understanding of the complex, multifaceted, and intricate dynamic that is counter-
terrorism. 
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 The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 has become the most defining moment of the 
last 20 years in American sociological history. This event has played, and continues to play, a 
major role in shaping the world we live in today. From the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to the 
American engagement in Yemen and Somalia, counter-terrorism and national security has been 
at the forefront of U.S. policy and the American people’s collective consciousness. Throughout 
the last 15 years, terrorism research has seen a major influx of research and scholarly work due 
to the 9/11 attacks.  
 It may be seen as unfair to be too critical of the media, populace, or even the government 
for their reactions to the 9/11 attacks, even this far removed from the events, but at the same time 
it is important to take this gaze and create critical analysis to better inform us for the present and 
the future. This is the main point of this thesis project. The goal is to take a critical look at three 
distinctly different aspects of the terrorism and counter-terrorism dynamic so as to better inform 
for the future. This is important because the past is prologue, and understanding how we have 
gotten to where we are in the counter-terrorism narrative is essential to help guide the way to a 
better path for the future.  
 There are major issues with the American counter-terrorism strategy stemming from its 
manifestation out of the 9/11 attacks, as well as the immediacy of action that terrorist groups 
invite due to the violent and harmful nature of their operations. Immediate actions like the war in 
Afghanistan or capture-and-kill missions serve an important purpose in eradicating serious 




in avoiding the unintended consequences of these missions. These consequences include 
damaging holistic countering violent extremism initiatives that looks to eradicate the systemic 
causes of terrorism and the environments that are conducive to those causes through engagement. 
It is my finding that the reasons for this are two-fold, and addressed in two of the three chapters 
herein.  
 The first issue, covered in chapter one, is that America became a modern version of what 
Wolfgang Schivelbusch calls a “Culture of Defeat.”
1
 In short, the shock, humiliation, and 
psychological stress from the “Black Swan” event of 9/11 created a an American consciousness- 
ruled by romanticism- that both desired an immediate response to the attacks, and had gained an 
intense fear of another terrorist attack. This new dynamic allowed the traumatized collective 
consciousness to be easily manipulated with the “us-vs.-them” or “Global War on Terrorism” 
(GWOT) narrative that was to become the main policy rhetoric throughout the Bush 
administration years.   
 The second issue, which is covered in chapter two, is again an issue of immediacy 
dealing with tactics. UAV technology, most notably unmanned drones that are weaponized, have 
become a fundamental tool in killing terrorist actors without a risk to U.S. military personnel. 
Second in command of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Said al-Shehri, and both the Deputy, 
and leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Wali-ur Rehman and Hakimullah Meshud are just a few of 
the high value targets that UAVs have struck.
234
 The strength and power that the technology 
                                                        
1 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat (New York: Picador, 2004), 3-4. 
2Alexander Marquardt, “Al Qaeda Leader Gets Lazy, Killed in Drone Strike, Terror Group Says,” ABC News (July 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/07/al-qaeda-leader-gets-lazy-killed-in-drone-strike-terror-group-says/ (visited 
August 14, 2014). 
3 Ashish Kumar Sen, “Pakistan, Pakistan: Drone strike kills key Taliban terrorist,” The Washington Times (May 29, 2013), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/29/pakistan-denounces-us-drone-strike-killed-taliban-/?page=all (visited 
August 14, 2014). 
4 “Drone strike in Pakistan kills head of Pakistan Taliban,” Fox News (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/11/01/drone-strike-in-pakistan-kills-head-pakistan-taliban-security-sources-say/ (visited 




gives the United States cannot be denied. It is a central tool in the fight against terrorist 
organizations.  At the same time there is an abundance of research that supports the notion that 
while UAV strike may be successful in striking targets they are also serving to harm 
comprehensive U.S. CVE and foreign policy efforts that would seek to destroy the systemic 
issues that allow terrorism culture to thrive. This is what has been described as “winning the 
battles at the sacrifice of the greater war.”  
 The third chapter of this thesis is a threat analysis of local Al Qaeda affiliate Al Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  It specifically looks at the destabilizing affect the group has on 
the Sahel region in Africa as well as interests within it.  Two general overarching themes were 
found during the course of researching AQIM: First, that it is impossible to judge a threat in 
absolute “yes or no” terms, but that in fact the different threats to different interests must be 
judged on a scale. While this may seem like an evasion to a degree, the intelligence community 
has always dealt in uncertainty and this kind of spectral thinking. It is vital that the public 
become accustomed to the reality that in counter-terrorism there are rarely clear-cut answers 
regarding threats. Second, when discussing Al Qaeda more accuracy or specificity is needed. 
Many times in the media and even within the policy-making world the term Al Qaeda is 
wantonly used as an umbrella blame-all, but in reality now that the Al Qaeda leadership has been 
decimated, the organization works as loosely connected local insurgent groups. Even within 
these groups, as with AQIM, there are usually even more localized, tribal, or goal-driven 
separate groups that can be at odds with each other in addition to fighting the global jihad or 
local insurgent battle. In this context it is important to understand that simply citing Al Qaeda in 
general is lacking the correct focused scope and respect for the intricacies of these organizations 




 The conclusion of this paper will provide the results of this thesis work. In contrast, this 
introduction will work best to serve as a brief primer as to what the reader will find in each 
chapter with regard to goals, thesis questions, and acknowledgement of the integral work or 
influence for the research itself.  
Chapter I: The Fallacy of the Global War on Terrorism and the American Culture of Defeat 
 In this chapter there are two distinct influences that should be acknowledged. The first is 
the Johns Hopkins class Military Strategy taught by professor Michael Vlahos. This class delved 
into the psychological and collective conscious realms of war and its effect on the populace from 
civilian and soldier to policymaker. How the psychological realities can influence a nation to act 
is an often overlooked and important perspective to study. When considering military action 
from a scholarly perspective we many times use rational and removed thought processes, but this 
disregards the nation state (comprised of the populace: civilian, solder, statesman, politician) as a 
collectively sentient and sometimes romanticism based being that can act as a macro-ego. This is 
supported by Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s “Culture of Defeat.” This work acts as the basis for the 
first half of chapter I, as it serves to contextualize the American grief, embarrassment, rage, and 
general collective psychological response to the 9/11 attacks in 7 of the 8 archetypal patterns 
theorized by Schivelbusch. While the attacks and American response were unique to the country, 
Schivelbusch’s archetypical theory shows that this romanticized response is actually quite 
universal and can be found in many examples throughout history.  
 The second section of this chapter serves to take the GWOT narrative- made rhetoric by 
the Bush administration- and analyze its effect on the American collective consciousness as well 
as true counter-terrorism initiatives. As a preface to the second section, the first section serves to 




trauma and consciousness allowed the Bush administration to push the fallacy that was the 
GWOT narrative on the populace. A narrative that played on American fears and anger that 
served to catalyze the “us vs. them” epic that created an extreme state of “Islamophobia” despite 
some efforts by the administration to dissuade this thinking.  
With this understanding the second section analyzes how the GWOT narrative affected 
the true counterterrorism initiatives in Afghanistan, created an Islamophobic culture, unrealistic 
margins for victory for the American public to look toward, as well as the war in Iraq and its 
distraction from true counter-terrorism efforts. At its core the chapter seeks to answer the 
question of how the 9/11 attacks affected the collective U.S. consciousness as well as the foreign 
policy that developed out of it. The research provides that America became an example of a 
modernized version of the “Culture of Defeat,” which also included policies or rhetoric that 
damaged the chances of being successful both from a collective consciousness healing 
standpoint, and a strategic perspective in countering Al Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations.   
Chapter II: Recommendations for the Evolution of American UAV Policy 
 Two classes from Johns Hopkins inform the second chapter of this thesis. Warfare by 
Other Means: Espionage and Covert Action in Foreign Policy taught by professor Nick 
Reynolds, and The Art & Practice of Intelligence taught by professor Mark Stout. Both classes 
explore the notion of covert action and how the American intelligence community operates. This 
chapter takes a critical perspective on U.S covert action in the form of unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) strikes. While technically still a covert operation, the Obama administration has openly 
admitted to these strikes and there is an enormous amount of attention to these strikes regarding 
their efficacy and their role in the larger counter-terrorism narrative. This chapter seeks to 




terrorism both on its own and by creating better cooperation with the U.S. foreign policy and 
counter terrorism initiatives writ large. It will provide policy recommendations for UAV 
practices that will allow the technology to become a more tactically successful and coordinated 
effort under the right jurisdiction, become part an effective and integrated part of the larger 
counter-terrorism strategy, be legally sound by creating due process under the law, and set norms 
for UAV use internationally. UAV strikes have the power and possibility to be one of the most 
useful or harmful tools in the counter-terrorism strategy.  Creating the right policy, strategic, and 
tactical rules for their use is essential to the overall U.S. counter-terrorism and foreign policy 
strategy.   
Chapter III: Al Qaeda in The Islamic Maghreb: A Threat Analysis  
 This chapter serves to provide a critical analysis of regional insurgent group Al Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The Johns Hopkins class American National Security taught by 
professor Ariel Roth inspired the conceptual framework or methodology. This chapter looks to 
answer the question as to what threat AQIM holds on the Sahel region, Western interests in the 
region, globalization in the region, and continental Europe. While the analysis is accurate and 
correct, an equally profound aspect of this work is the realization that AQIM is not as 
fundamentally unified even on the local or regional level as most policymakers seem to believe. 
Fractious groups compete and fight over territory, criminal markets, smuggling routes, and 
religious or political differences. The media and government serve to constantly point the finger 
at a generalized Al Qaeda or regional group when in truth the focus should be much sharper as 







 The goal of this work is an attempt to truly understand, analyze, and critique the 
complexity of the terrorism and counter-terrorism dynamic to better inform the audience that will 
shape this narrative going into the future. Using micro (threat analysis of AQIM), mid (UAV 
policy recommendations), and macro (9/11 attacks the GWOT) examples, this thesis searches to 
answer questions that arise out of the complexity of the counter-terrorism narrative and the 
extensive grasp it has on the U.S. and international community. The reader should leave more 
informed and with a better understanding of the complexities of the counter-terrorism dynamic, 








The Fallacy of the Global War on Terrorism 
and the American Culture of Defeat 
Introduction 
 
 In the course of U.S. collective history there are landmark moments that serve to define 
the country as a society, culture, and mutual consciousness. Many of these events are 
unexpected, and in turn the consequences of these events are rarely understood in their 
complexity. For “The Greatest Generation” their moment lasted years in the shape of WWII, the 
effects of which were felt immensely and immediately throughout the United States and the 
entire world as the planet was thrown into complete chaos for an extended period of time. For the 
“Baby Boomers” and their parents the defining moment was November 22, 1963 when young 
idealistic president John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. The American first 
family’s tragedy left a nation in a concentrated collective state of mourning that the people of the 
United States had never experienced before. This “where were you?” event was the pinnacle of a 
focused American collective grief for thirty-eight years.  
 Out of the ashes of the twin towers in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington D.C., 
and the fields of Shanksville, Pennsylvania, September 11, 2001 served to refocus America’s 
collective trauma and consciousness with an emotional power like few events in American 
history ever had.
 5
 2,977 people were killed on September 11, 2001.
6
 In New York City alone, 
343 firefighters, 23 police officers and 30 Port Authority officers perished.
7
 While these numbers 
are important in measuring the cost of 9/11, even more so than the close to 300 billion lost 
                                                        
5  The American collective consciousness refers to the populace’s shared ideas, feelings, beliefs, and attitudes, which create a 
unifying or shared emotional congruence within the country.   
6 “September 11 Anniversary Fast Facts,” CNN (July 27, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/ (visited March, 11 2014). 






 in reality the human cost that continues in the collective national psyche and 
memory has been much more expensive and devastating, and it continues to this day.  
 In light of this attack, the collective U.S. psyche had been shaken to its core. As a 
country, the populace was scared, ashamed, angry, disturbed, and shocked all at the same time. 
Research and polling shows that in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and even twelve 
years later, Americans as a collective were dominated by emotions of sadness, anger, confusion, 
and anxiety from the event.
9
 This overwhelming trauma, collective anxiety, and grief made a 
fundamental change in the American logic from a political and societal perspective.  
America is traditionally considered a rational state regarding decision-making, but Lt. 
Col W. J. Strickland finds that the 9/11 attacks created a romanticism-based ideology where “the 
response to 9/11 was located in feelings of national vulnerability, wounded sensibilities and 
distinctive views in the Bush administration.” The rational state and public had become one ruled 
by collective trauma and emotionally troubling mindsets.
10
 The country had experienced a 
“Black Swan,” or large scale and hard to predict event where there was no simple answer that 
could assuage the fears created from the attacks.  
Despite being a Black Swan event, the United States, as a culture and society, tried to 
reconcile the events both from a strategic defense failure, but also from a cultural lens. This is 
not possible- by the very definition of a Black Swan event- and spawned directed and 
generalized hate at the stereotypical terrorist identity, which the government had portrayed as 
                                                        
8 “September 11 Anniversary Fast Facts,” CNN. 
9 David Ciunk, “9/11 and Americans’ Changing Value Preference: Period Effects or Permanent Change?” Franklin & Marshall 
College, https://edisk.fandm.edu/david.ciuk/Values911Paper5.pdf (visited September 15, 2014). 
10 W J Strickland, “Romantic Urges: American responses to 9/11,” Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 







 This is just one example of the way U.S. perceptions changed or romantically 
reacted to the 9/11 attacks.  
The research question this chapter seeks to answer is to what effect did the 9/11 attacks 
have on the United States collective consciousness as well as counter-terrorism policy? The 
methodology used to answer this question was to first research by reviewing scholarly articles, 
think tank pieces, as well as news and polls, and then to divide the findings into two distinct 
sections.      
 The first section of this chapter breaks down the American psychological or collective 
response to the 9/11 attacks. It analyzes this post-9/11 response in the context of a modern day 
version of Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s “Culture of Defeat.” The thrust of the “Culture of Defeat” 
context is to gauge the effect defeat has on a society. Schivelbusch applies the “Culture of 
Defeat” theory mainly to the great wars of modernity and the kind of defeat that Nazi Germany 
suffered in 1945. In measuring defeat he discovered archetypes that are to a degree universal in 
nature and can be applied to different states throughout the course of history. It is my contention 
that while the 9/11 attacks are not of a similar magnitude, scope, or style of defeat in comparison 
to Schivelbusch’s examples, at the same time the theory can be applied and is a valid description 
of the American response to the 9/11 attacks. Not only is the comparison valid, but the 
conclusion is that it can help explain the American public’s acceptance of the GWOT narrative 
that was also a reaction to the 9/11 attacks.  
With the conclusion from the first section regarding the collective consciousness of the 
U.S. psyche, the second section of this chapter, examines the incorrect framing, or the fallacy of 
                                                        
11 Jennifer Young, “Cultivating a Culture of Fear: Post 9/11 America,” Al Waref, 
http://www.alwaref.org/en/component/content/article/62-war-and-peace/49-cultivating-a-culture-of-fear-post-911-america- 




the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) strategy and its manifestation of the “epic” mythos, 
Islamophobia, and most importantly the Iraq war. 
In section one, the conclusion is that the U.S. psyche as a result from the 9/11 attacks can 
be likened to a modern day version of Schivelbusch’s “Culture of Defeat.” In section two the 
conclusion is that the GWOT narrative had unintended consequences that served to further 
impair the American collective consciousness by creating a constant state of fear or anxiety, 
unattainable goals, and a war in Iraq that while disastrous on its own, additionally distracted and 
damaged true counter-terrorism initiatives. In addition to the findings in section one and two, the 
summation of this chapter will provide a new narrative or “anti-narrative” that should be applied 
currently to countering terrorism writ large.   
Literature Review 
 
 Before contextualizing post-9/11 America as a modern “Culture of Defeat,” with the 
resulting ability to be more easily manipulated by narratives, it is important to look at the 
literature that touches on this subject. While this contextualization is a somewhat unique 
position, there is a wealth of literature that addresses the effect a traumatic event can have on a 
populace or collective consciousness as well as perspectives specifically on the American 
response to the 9/11 attacks.  This literature that defines the 9/11 attack as an experience that 
created a collective trauma and then a collective consciousness is important as it serves as the 
catalyst for defining America as a modern “Culture of Defeat.”  The following section of this 
literature review covers pieces that give credence to the idea of the collective consciousness that 
manifested itself out of the 9/11 attacks.  
 Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s work provides the contextual framework in classifying 




define a culture as defeated, but he also specifically addresses the 9/11 attacks in the epilogue of 
his work. Schivelbusch compares the intensity of trauma for the American people dealing with 
an attack on the World Trade Center compared to the Pentagon. The Pentagon, which represents 
more of a castle or military symbol, in a sense can be an expected, and in some ways 
psychologically acceptable, target to the public, but the World Trade Center was a more uniquely 
American symbol of capitalism. On a more universal level, he compares the literal height of the 
towers as a symbol of “control, lordship, and mastery.”
12
 Schivelbusch posits this personal blow 
or “fall” was incredibly traumatic to the American people.  
 In his review of Schivelbusch’s “Culture of Defeat,” Scott McCracken likens all of the 
archetypical patters as part of a greater delusion or “dream state” that stands in the way of 
national “recovery,” or a “return to reason through acceptance.”
13
 McCracken also defines 
Schivelbusch as psycho-mythographic. This makes sense as the event and its aftermath can 
clearly be defined by psychological and mythic responses. 
 John Updergraff, Alexander Dunst, and Issa Khalaf all support the idea of a traumatized 
American collective consciousness forming in a response to the 9/11 attacks. The difference lies 
in the effect of this newly created consciousness. Whereas Updergraff finds this as a coping 
mechanism, Dunst finds the creation of victim culture, and Khalaf sees a collective mentality that 
is unable to reflect and cope with the events, instead opting for revenge as a way to heal. Dunst 
and Khalaf’s conclusions on the collective consciousness post-9/11 support McCracken’s theory 
that these archetype stages stand in the way of a return to rational thinking.   
 In his research, John Updegraff finds that Americans who found meaning in the attacks 
were able to cope or adjust and reduce fears of future terrorist attacks. The study finds that even 
                                                        
12 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat (New York: Picador, 2004), 292. 




people who are indirectly affected by large-scale collective traumas can find meaning in the 
events.
 14
 This concept supports the idea in this paper that a traumatic event like 9/11 can create a 
collective consciousness when a person tries to understand and rationalize the traumatic event. 
This collective consciousness theory fits nicely with Schivelbusch’s concept that a state can 
collectively respond to an event.
 
 
 Dr. Alexander Dunst found that the 9/11 attacks created a collective consciousness or 
“unique collective trauma” for the American people that he dubs “injury culture.” Dunst finds 
that experiencing the 9/11 attacks as a collective trauma helped the American people move from 
grief to a more aggressive attitude. The study also finds that the American public sought refuge 
in a victim or suffering identity.
 15
 This identity is closely associated with many of the archetypes 
that create a “Culture of Defeat” including the “Awakening” and “Renewal” archetype stages.  
 Issa Khalaf is intensely critical of the American response to the 9/11 attacks. Similar to 
Dunst’s theory about aggression as a form of adaptation, Khalaf finds there to be lack a lack of 
authentic reflection and introspection after the events and in the following years. In addition to a 
lack of understanding, Khalaf proposes that the event became a rallying cry for an unjust and 
mythic war seen as way to mend the wounds from the 9/11 attacks.  In his critique of the United 




                                                        
14 John Updergraff, “Collective Traumas: Early Explanations of 9/11 Linked to Long–term Adjustment.” Science Daily (Sept. 3, 
2008), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/09/080902143239.htm (visited September 5, 2014). 
15Dr. Alexander Dunst, “After Trauma: Thinking American Culture Beyond 9/11,” academia.edu (May 2012), 
http://www.academia.edu/1539512/After_Trauma_Thinking_American_Culture_Beyond_9_11 (visited September 30, 2014). 
16 Issa Khalaf, “America’s collective denial of 9/11’s meaning,” Mondoweiss (Sept. 2011), 
http://mondoweiss.net/2011/09/america%E2%80%99s-collective-denial-of-911%E2%80%99s-meaning  




 Lt. Col W J Strickland theorizes that the American response to the 9/11 attacks 
represented a shift to a romantic ideology.
17
 The theory is that America as a populace and 
government is usually a rational actor in decision-making, but that the traumatic events of 9/11 
created a collective emotional response that featured “vulnerability, fear and anger.”
18
 He goes 
on to theorize that this collective romantic response manifested a collective consciousness that 
was susceptible to manipulation by the Bush administration in the form of the Global War on 
Terror narrative and it’s terminology. This theory of a shift to romanticism as the driver for the 
collective consciousness lends support to the idea of how the trauma of 9/11 created a collective 
response and consciousness that was ruled by romanticism and not rationalism and therefore 
more vulnerable to both becoming a modern “Culture of Defeat” as well as a victim to rhetoric 
and manipulation by the Bush administration. His work is very much in line with Dr. Dunst in 
defining the American collective consciousness born out of the 9/11 attacks. This paper draws on 
this theory of an evolution to a romanticized ideology as a response to the 9/11 attacks as well as 
why the collective was so easily lured into the GWOT narrative.   
 The previous authors address the United States specifically, but it is worthwhile to look at 
another modern example where Schivelbuschian archetypes can be seen. Shannon Thomas takes 
a balanced look at the collective consciousness of Palestinians and Israelis
19
, two diametrically 
opposed groups that both have equal claims on collective trauma. Thomas theorizes that trauma 
helps to form what she calls “collective memory.” She applies this further in the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict by deducing that each collective manifests national narratives of pride and 
                                                        
17 W J Stricland, “Romantic Urges: American responses to 9/11,” Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 
http://www.da.mod.uk/Research-Publications/category/62/romantic-urges-american-responses-to-911-19075 (visited September 
15, 2014). 
18 Ibid.  
19 Shannon Thomas, “Collective memory, collective trauma, collective hatred,” Open Democracy (Aug. 25, 2014), 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/transformation/shannon-thomas/collective-memory-collective-trauma-collective-hatred (visited 




perceived victimhood which in turn allows for an easy justification for moral superiority.
20
 This 
dynamic can be applied to the American public’s collective consciousness after the 9/11 attacks 
and also aligns with Schivelbusch’s archetype “Losers in Battle, Winners in Spirit.” Thomas also 
brings examples from other modern conflicts in the world where “Culture of Defeat” archetypes 
are being displayed. This works in supporting this paper’s assertion that Schivelbusch’s “Culture 
of Defeat” can be applied in a modern setting.    
 There is a wealth of literature that supports the notion of 9/11 as a traumatic event that 
created a collective response, memory or consciousness. Out of this trauma and connection came 
a collective consciousness that can be defined as an “injury culture” or more broadly as a 
consciousness ruled by romanticism as opposed to rationalism. It is my theory that this plays into 
the American populace becoming a modern version of Schivelbusch’s “Culture of Defeat.”  
 The second part of this literature review will cover the cultural and sociological effects of 
the 9/11 attacks with some specific literature regarding Islamophobia and its manifestation.  
 Both the Barna Group and David Ciunk explore not only the cultural and psychological 
response to the 9/11 attacks, they also drill into how the collective consciousness became more 
accepting of policy that was at odds with civil liberties.  
 Non-profit organization the Barna Group performed extensive research into the emotional 
and spiritual effects of 9/11 via survey. The study found that events like 9/11 and other terrorist 
attacks change the national culture and consciousness. Polls showed that Americans value 
terrorism prevention as equally as important as “preservation of families, immigration, 
healthcare, unemployment and education.”
21
 This is not in the immediate aftermath, but twelve 
years after the fact. The study also notes that “millennials” are the group most likely to put 
                                                        
20 Shannon Thomas, “Collective memory, collective trauma, collective hatred,” Open Democracy (Aug. 25, 2014) 
21 “The Emotional and Spiritual Aftermath of 9/11 and Boston,” Barna Group, https://www.barna.org/barna-update/culture/626-




terrorism prevention priorities above all else. This is telling, as individuals in this age group were 
adolescents and children during the attacks, which makes a strong case for the intense collective 
trauma and effect on this group during their formative years.  Not surprisingly the dominant 
emotions in the aftermath of the attacks were of a more romantic- as opposed to rational- nature 
with Americans overwhelmingly reporting feeling sadness, anger, fear, confusion, and anxiety 
even twelve years after the events. This points to the strong effect of the traumatic event for the 
nation, but also the connected collective trauma and consciousness as Americans all over the 
country report experiencing the same emotional responses both immediately afterward and 
twelve years later.  
 David Ciunk’s paper goes deeper than the Barna Group’s study and finds that the 
emotional state immediately afterward made Americans not only value terrorism prevention, but 
that they would give up classically American rights or ideals to ensure this prevention.
22
 Ciunk 
quotes the attacks as a “trigger for cultural upheaval” which led to this type of collective thinking 
and shift towards authoritarian values. This would explain why Americans, in what I term a 
modern “Culture of Defeat,” were willing and able to accept the Bush legislation that severely 
encroached on core American principles.   
 Kevin Brown, in the same vein as the previous two works, looks to capture the cultural 
changes in the American collective consciousness after the 9/11 attacks. He notes that Americans 
from all over the country shared the feeling that “everything is different now.”
23
 There is 
mention that the initial sense of trauma manifested into a severe form of patriotism where any 
opinions that focused on other issues that might conflict with national security could be 
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considered “quasi-treasonous.” Like the Barna group and Ciunk, Brown finds a collective putting 
a premium on security above all else including the impairment of civil rights. This sentiment 
further supports the theory that the Bush administration was able to move forward with their 
legislation and rhetoric as critical opinions were not rationally accepted, but rather romantically 
hyperbolized into anti-American ideology. Brown posits the idea that Americans after 9/11 
collectively had to deal with accepting that there will always be some risk of an attack, despite 
best efforts to eliminate and reduce said risk. The infallible secure image that was part of the 
American collective consciousness was shattered by the 9/11 attacks.  
 In close conjunction with Brown, Greg Jaffe looks at the effect of the 9/11 attacks a 
decade later and sees that America has changed in a fundamental way regarding how its people 
understand or view war and peace. Like Brown, Jaffe finds that war is now a natural and 
accepted part of the American culture. Jaffe finds that when people talk of peace the general 
public will view this idea, as naive or quixotic- peace has become a dirty word in many 
respects.
24
 This work shines a light on the disturbing reality that war has become an acceptable 
and in many ways expected way of life for the American collective consciousness since the 9/11 
attacks. This paper also finds this as evidence that war was in some ways used as a means to 
mend the wounds of the 9/11 attacks.  
 Eric Miller explores the significance of the Ground Zero site to the American collective 
consciousness both in its immediacy and a decade later in addition to comparing it to other 
classic American battlefield sites. Miller also touches on Osama bin Laden’s death and its failure 
to provide the sense of closure a classic victory might. Additionally he finds that not only did bin 
Laden’s death not give the American collective consciousness finite closure, but also exposed 
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that Americans are still searching for a way to create peace and understanding with Islamism.
25
 
This work seems to prove that even the death of Osama bin Laden was unable to relieve the 
collective consciousness of their existential turmoil.   
 A major identifying aspect of the post-9/11 American collective consciousness is an 
amplified fear of Muslims, and erroneously people from the Middle East or South Central Asia 
who are believed to be Muslim based on appearance. More accurately, there is a fear of people 
that Americans viewed simply as looking like the 9/11 terrorists. Kathryn Ecklund explores this 
idea in her research paper “Attitudes Toward Muslim Americans Post-9/11.” There are two 
takeaways from the research. First, Muslims, Arabs, and people who may resemble the 
“terrorist” stereotype have an increased fear of other cultures because of anxiety over retribution 
for the 9/11 attacks. Second, fear or mistrust of Muslims (or perceived Muslims) is not universal 
but more of a situation-specific dynamic.
26
 
 Kathryn Ecklund is not alone in researching attitudes towards Muslims with respect to 
the 9/11 attacks. In both Nader Entessar’s review of "The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, 
Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror," and Jackleen M Salem’s article they explore the 





 Shiraz Dossa, in "Lethal Muslims: White-trashing Islam and the Arabs," finds that 
Islamophobia is not only driven by racial undertones and a “class antipathy,” but also due to a 
“settler logic of white supremacy.”
29
 Arun Kundnani likens the GWOT narrative and its attack 
                                                        
25 Eric D. Miller, "Finding Meaning at Ground Zero for Future Generations: Some Reflections A Decade After 9/11," 
International Social Science Review 86, no. ¾ (June 2001): 113. 
26 Mussarat Khan, Kathryn Ecklund, “Attitudes Toward Muslim Americans Post-9/11,” Stigma Volume 7, Issue 1 (2012): 2. 
27 Nader Entessar, "The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror." Library Journal 
139, no. 6 (March 2014): 104. 
28 Jackleen M Salem, "Citizenship in Question: Chicago Muslims Before and After 9/11," Muslim World Journal Of Human 
Rights Volume 7, no. 2 (2011): 1-20. 
29 Shiraz Dossa, "Lethal Muslims: White-trashing Islam and the Arabs," Journal Of Muslim Minority Affairs Issue 28, no. 2 




on Islam as a new “cold war” against Islamism.
30
 In this paper it is a conclusion that the 
manifestation and increase in Islamophobia is a major effect of the GWOT narrative. 
 The New York Times, Jennifer Young, and Robert Brennan are all critical of the media 
from the news and entertainment, to government awareness campaigns. Despite the different 
angle each piece takes, they share in their criticism that media served to stoke American’s fear, 
anger and Islamophobia.  
 In a critical look at the media’s function in the post 9/11 American culture the New York 
Times finds the media taking advantage of the American collective consciousness by playing on 
their “fear, anger, a desire for revenge.”
31
 Instead of downplaying or trying to assuage American 
suspicions, popular media played on the fears of another terrorist attack and the fight for 
American survival. While successful in creating hit shows like “24” and movies with similar 
plots, this manipulation of the American psyche only prolonged the healing of the traumatic 
wound inflicted on 9/11. 
 Where the New York Times finds fault in popular media and entertainment, Jennifer 
Young sees the same fault in government campaigns. Young explores the generalized cultural of 
fear that manifested itself out of the 9/11 attacks, and finds that the collective unity and strength 
that came out of the attacks is a positive outcome. While this paper agrees with the culture of 
fear created, like Dunst and Khalaf, it disagrees with Young, who finds a collective unity that is 
positive. Despite Young’s theory that the outcome of the 9/11 attacks is positive, she is critical 
that out of the attacks came rhetoric that stereotyped terrorists or terrorism as a solely Middle 
Eastern venture. Young takes specific examples including the famous “The Global Faces of 
Terrorism” poster and theorizes that media and similar rhetoric of this type helped inspire 
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increased aggression toward certain minorities.
32
 Young also finds that this increased aggression 
or fear is a building block to destabilizing trust and tolerance on larger scale within the entire 
country.  
 Robert Brennan studies the idea of a terrorist from the American cultural and 
psychological perspective. While Brennan acknowledges the very real threat of terrorism and 
terrorists, he also explores the sensationalism in the media and administration rhetoric that has 
created a symbolic “monster.” A monster that the collective psyche can paint or dress up anyway 
they see fit using a cultural and psychological lens as a sort of coping method.
33
  This work is 
important as it shows how the American collective- in a romantically inspired temperament 
helped by the media and administration rhetoric- was able to turn a terrorist, or the idea of one, 
into an all-encompassing monster. While this paper finds the terrorists who perpetrated the 9/11 
attacks worthy of the “monster” label, it finds credence in Brennan’s research that shows how the 
media and administration played on the fears of terrorism for both financial and policy 
advantages.   
 In a comparable theory to Robert Brennan’s “monster” concept, Jason Thompson argues 
that President Bush used ”Hitlerian Rhetoric” and the idea to make the “non-Western” or Muslim 
the “common enemy.” Thompson also argues that President Bush revives “Orientalism” and tries 
to create a dichotomy between “good and evil, freedom and fear, and democracy and terrorism” 
or the Christian vs. Eastern Muslim epic. This portrayal of President Bush and his rhetoric 
supports the theory that the GWOT narrative created Islamophobia as well as an 
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 Altwaiji Mubarak, like Jason Thompson, focuses on orientalism. Mubarak finds that in a 
post-9/11 America, the media and policymakers manifested a “neo-Orientalism” that “focuses on 
‘othering’ the Arab world.” Mubarak defines this “neo-Orientalism” as a continuance of 
“Orientalism” based on “binarism between the superior American values and the inferior Arab 




 Both Brennan and Mubarak’s theories on “Orientalism and “othering” provide evidence 
of the Bush administration rhetoric that was sub-textually pushing an agenda that was creating 
Islamophobia. That is not to say that this was intended, in fact this paper finds that it is more an 
unintended byproduct of the simplistic rhetoric, which made the GWOT narrative an easy sell to 
the American public.  
 Jeffrey Record theorizes that the GWOT narrative resides in the idea that because 
terrorism is viewed as the ultimate evil, whatever has to be done to defeat the threat can be 
deemed necessary. Record is also critical of the conflation of Iraq and the GWOT, as well as a 
non-discriminatory policy with regard to the actual threat that the U.S. was trying to counter after 
the 9/11 attacks.  Record also supports a theory in this paper that the GWOT narrative created 
ambitious goals that in reality would never be able to be accomplished which created an anxious 
or unnerved collective consciousness.
36
 David Oakley and Pat Proctor’s research supports 
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Record’s theory on a lack of discrimination and also posits that an inability to understand the true 
enemy has cost the U.S. in both resources and American lives.
37
  
 Like Jeffrey Record, Alastair Finlan is critical of war in Iraq and posits that planning for 
the war in Iraq served as a serious distraction to counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan. Finlan 
details the Bush administration planning for Iraq almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks and 
most noticeably before a link was made to Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks.
 38
 Finlan provides 
concrete evidence that this paper uses to show how the GWOT narrative and planning for the 
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Section I: A Country Defeated 
 
…the minority within the victorious nation who recognize the danger of hubris 
-Wolfgang Schivelbusch  
 
 Part of what was so shocking about the 9/11 attacks was the its inconceivability. As 
Schivelbusch states, “nations are as incapable of imagining their own defeat as individuals are of 
conceiving their own death.”
39
 For American society this was especially true, as their geographic 
and psychological space had not been invaded since WWII. In that case it was a military base far 
away in the Pacific, which provided both a geographic and psychological buffer, especially in 
comparison to the attacks of 9/11, which arguably struck at what could be called the 
psychological center of America (Washington D.C. and New York City).  Five years after the 
attacks, Columbia Sociologist Mary Marshall Clark interviewed hundreds of Americans that 
were directly affected and stated, “I was shocked by how present the past was, how so little of it 
was the past. "The trauma is still so real for those who lived through it."
40
 This perception is 
understandable as the American public continues to deal with intense security measures and a 
bombardment of graphic imagery from the attacks “making emotional and psychological 
distance from the trauma almost impossible.”
41
 Clausewitz defines the type of incomprehensible 
reality Americans faced in 9/11 aptly:  
The effect of all this outside the army-on the people and on the government is a 
sudden collapse of the most anxious expectations, and a complete crushing of 
self-confidence. This leaves a vacuum that is filled by a corrosively expanding 
fear, which completes the paralysis.
42
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While Clausewitz is describing what he witnessed during Napoleon’s defeat of Prussia at Jena-
Auerstedt in 1806, the description of fear, anxiety, and paralysis perfectly encapsulates the 
American psyche or collective trauma directly after the 9/11 attacks.  
Schivelbusch builds on Clausewitz’s theory by adding that “The intensity of the shock 
(from defeat) increases in direct proportion to the distance from the actual site of defeat.”
43
 In the 
case of 9/11 this is especially true as the geographic location was on American soil, directed at 
epicenters of population, culture, and business, and specifically directed at civilians, and not 
armed forces. The distance from “defeat” was naught, and so the shock or terror was at the 
highest conceivable level. What can bring a country out of this shock or paralysis is what 
Clausewitz calls “the instinct for retaliation and revenge…It is a universal instinct …never 
higher than when it comes to repaying that kind of debt."
44
  
 While every country and situation is different, Schivelbusch describes a set of eight 
archetypes or patterns that a nation can go through after suffering a defeat from an emotional 
perspective or what Scott McCracken summarizes as “defeat empathy” or what can also be 
defined as the collective’s self-reconciliation in his review of Schivelbusch’s work.
45
  
 While Schivelbusch applies this theory to situations of classical warfare by which armies 
take geographic territory and in some cases rule over occupied territories or states, it is the 
contention of this chapter that this theory can be applied to the American collective 
consciousness post-9/11 with the acceptance that this would be a modern version of the theory 
that is defined by a terrorist attack and not an invading or occupying army. With the exception of 
one archetype, the reader will see that these patterns are in many ways universal and can be 
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applied to this more modern situation. More importantly, one can takeaway from this theory and 
its application a historical understanding of the American response to such a “Black Swan” or 
incomprehensible event.   
 What follows is analysis of these seven archetypes contextualized by the American 
collective consciousness following the 9/11 attacks. In addition to this contextualization it will 
provide modern theorists’ examinations of this collective consciousness to make what this 
chapter terms a modern “Culture of Defeat” born out of Schivelbusch’s original theory.  
Dreamland 
 
 The Dreamland state can be characterized as a surreal release from the depressing reality 
of the situation. Schivelbusch refers to this as a “unique euphoria”
46
 that is encapsulated with 
scapegoating in two forms. The first takes place in the blaming of the military or national 
security complex. This came in the form of a harsh criticism of the U.S. intelligence community 
from both elected officials and the American public. The most popular criticism came in the 
form of the 9/11 Commission, which found that the Intelligence Community was poorly 
coordinated and that agencies competed as rivals more often than collaborators especially 
through a lack of sharing intelligence inter-departmentally.
47
  
The blaming of U.S Intelligence allowed for politicians and the public to rationalize the 
irrational event that had occurred. This validation allowed the U.S. to become comfortable or 
“euphoric” in Schivelbusch’s terms as the American collective consciousness found an 
explanation for how something like 9/11 could happen.  
 The other scapegoat was the Muslim religion itself. By regarding it as a radical, violent, 
irrational, and offensive ideology, Americans were able to reconcile the type of terrorist attack to 
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which they fell victim.
48
 Arun Kundnani details how the attacks and subsequent wars on terror 
have created Islamophobia, in both the United States and United Kingdom.
49
 Jackleen M. Salem 
also concluded that as a result of 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., there has been a systematic 





 In essence the Dreamland state for Americans was largely about dealing with the 
overwhelming collective emotional reaction that the 9/11 attacks had literally changed life as the 
populace knew it.
52
 As traumatic as 9/11 was on its own, a major psychological aspect that 
played into American fear, anxiety, and paralysis was the unanswerable question “How could 
this happen to us?” With the proper parties blamed this question did not play as heavily on the 
collective consciousness, which allowed for a small degree of release or comfort.  
Awakening 
 The Awakening stage takes a turn from the Dreamland state. The blame continues to be 
cast in the same direction as in the Dreamland state, but in the American sense a new character is 
set to blame, which in this case was President Bush. In the direct aftermath of 9/11 President 
Bush enjoyed astronomically high approval ratings. The graph on the following page (Figure 1) 
shows the aggregated approval ratings, and clearly illustrates President Bush’s downward trend 
in support following the initial bump after the attacks.  
More direct evidence comes in the form of a poll conducted by CNN four years after the 
attacks, which found “the percentage of Americans who blame the Bush administration for the 
September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington has risen from almost a third to 
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almost half over the past four years.”
53
 Additionally, the same poll found that of those questioned 
45 percent blamed the Bush administration for the attacks either a "great deal" or a "moderate 







With President Bush, betrayal was born out of allegations that immediate members of 
Osama bin Laden’s family were urgently evacuated out of the country after the attacks,
56
 and 
second, that President Bush continued to sit in a classroom during a reading demo for an 
inordinate amount of time after learning of the attacks. While the facts or veracity of these 
narratives is disputed, it is not questioned that after an immediate bump in approval ratings 
directly after the attacks, President Bush’s approval ratings suffered and dropped to all time lows 
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due to a public that was now questioning his familial history and connections, as well as his 
actions and leadership in responding to the 9/11 attacks in the following years.  
While there is not an accurate metric to judge the effect there was a notable influx of 
conspiracy theories calling 9/11 an inside job perpetrated by the Bush administration which 
became popular to a degree. This is most notable with the independent documentary “Loose 
Change” that made this “insider” theory popular. While not granted any credibility by the 
academic community it should be noted that to some degree this conspiracy theory proliferation 
might have added to the lowering favorability numbers for Bush  
The previous paragraphs provide evidence as to why the public blamed President Bush 
for the 9/11 attacks as well as his leadership in years following. With regard to specifically 
allowing the attack to occur the blame that was put on President Bush and his administration as 
seen in the aforementioned CNN poll can be attributed to “The Man in the Dock Model” 
described by Elliot A. Cohen. In this model when suffering defeat, the public will find it enticing 
to put the blame on one individual, usually the leader, for creating the disaster out of “his own 
incompetence and stupidity.”
57
 This model is appropriate at addressing the degree to which the 
public found President Bush culpable for allowing the 9/11 attacks to occur. While it is simple 
and enticing to place the blame on the individual it is also rarely valid or accurate as is the case 
in this “Black Swan” type of situation.           
Unworthy Victories 
 The Unworthy Victory pattern resonates strongly with the American collective psyche in 
response to the 9/11 attacks. This archetype is one in which perception of the enemy’s victory is 
seen as being cheap, dishonorable, and specifically in the case of 9/11, murderous. Schivelbusch 
articulates this ethos from the victim’s perspective stating, “the distinction between civilized and 
                                                        




barbaric warfare remain very much alive, especially in the losers’ perennial claims that the 
victors cheated and that their victories were therefore illegitimate.
58
  
 Schivelbusch is predominantly addressing the great wars of modernity featuring the likes 
of Napoleon, but even in this vein there is still a likening to terrorism with the idea of 
“unsoldierly” tactics that have led to a cheapened victory.
59
  Again we see a way for the losing 
state to rationalize their demise: “Thus, the defeated party can always declare the decisive factor 




 From the American collective consciousness, the 9/11 terrorist attacks were illegitimate, 
“unsoldierly,” barbaric, and cowardly “violation” of the rules, and therefore an unworthy victory. 
Terrorism is always an unworthy victory and this assumption of barbarism is in fact accurate. 
This is not a case of Western ethnocentrism or perception. When an attack is truly one of terror 
there is no foundation to stand upon. “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” is a 
universal fallacy.  
 At this point it is necessary to acknowledge that Critical terrorism studies (CTS) scholars 
disagree with this sentiment. CTS academics argue that orthodox terrorism studies is biased due 
to its “strong institutional links” including “state security projects.” They find these links and 
connections to the state created flawed research that seeks to problem-solve as opposed to pure 
scholarly pursuits.
61
 While these are valid concerns, the CTS community loses respect when it 
comes to their defense of the “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” statement. 
Namely in finding the definition of a terrorist to be subjective. Jeffrey Sulka states, “While 
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legitimate resistance movements sometimes employ terroristic tactics, it is usually wrong to 
portray them as ‘terrorists’ rather than insurgents or freedom fighters.”
62
 Sulka’s theory is 
contradictory and incorrect. A resistance in no way can be considered legitimate if they 
purposefully target innocent civilians. With this kind of ideology it is hard to appreciate other 
tenets of the CTS agenda that may have validity. 
 While the depiction of the attacks is valid and accurate, another vital aspect of the 
Unworthy Victories pattern is the fallacious epic depiction that evolves. For the U.S. collective 
consciousness it is a romanticized defense of freedom, way of life, and democracy embodied in 
its citizens and the troops sent to Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy is demonized as “freedom 
hating” and that the attack against America was simply because the radical Islamic terrorist hates 
the rights that come with the American brand of democracy.
63
 The romanticized vision of this 
epic is detailed by Jason Thompson through his critique of the Bush administration and the 
manifestation of this idea:  
Throughout his presidency Bush will audition several distinctions (most   
noticeably good and evil, freedom and fear, and democracy and terrorism) the 
base distinction- offered palpably in this speech- invites the Western Christian 
(Occidental) to consciously other the Eastern Muslim (Oriental)
64
 
This “othering” or distinction between the Occidental and Oriental or Eastern Muslim goes hand 
in hand with the final aspect of the Unworthy Victory pattern. Now that the roles have been 
assigned and the acceptance of loss– albeit a perceived unworthy victory by the enemy- has been 
accepted, Schivelbusch describes the environment that has now been created: “If the victors’ 
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triumph is seen as illegitimate profiteering and thus can stake no claim to glory and honor, defeat 
is not an outcome that must be acknowledged and accepted but an injustice to be rectified.”
65
 
Losers in Battle, Winners in Spirit 
 In this archetype there are two aspects at play, both the demonization of the enemy and 
the celebration of the valiancy or nobility of those who tried to defend the state. There are 
historical examples where the valiancy and effort of soldiers is celebrated despite actually losing 
in battle. The most famous example may be General Custer’s heroic last stand at Little Big Horn. 
Despite losing to Lakota Sioux and Cheyenne warriors and occurring in 1876, Custer’s last stand 
is ubiquitous in American culture.
66
 Another example can be seen in the evacuation of Allied 
forces at Dunkirk. While a retreat, the idea of “Dunkirk Spirit” was born when “little ships” or 
private vessels bravely assisted in the evacuation from France.
67
 This idea carries on today as 
even the Macmillan Dictionary has an entry for “Dunkirk Spirit” citing it as “an attitude of being 
very strong in a difficult situation and refusing to accept defeat.”
68
 
 In the case of 9/11, the winners in spirit were the New York police and fire departments, 
who bravely attempted to save as many lives as possible during the attack and also suffered great 
losses. America and the world celebrated and honored the NYPD and NYFD as well as all first 
responders for their acts of courage. They became the image of strength and valor in the face of 
such cowardly attacks. In this archetype there is a direct correlation with “Unworthy Victories.” 
Despite being defeated the loser retains their perceived “cultural and moral superiority” over 
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 This perception serves as a moral saving grace, that despite being bested, the 
collective romanticizes that the strike is an illegitimate victory, which allows the collective to 
retain superiority in all manners of speaking. In close conjunction with Thompson’s work from 
the previous section, Altwaiji Mubarak focuses on America’s post 9/11 attacks “Neo-orientalist” 
representation or interpretation of Muslims or Eastern Arabs. While an update on classic 
“orientalist” views, Mubarak defines it as “a monolithic discourse based on binarism between the 
superior American values and the inferior Arab culture.”
70
 Mubarak goes so far as to cite critics 
who suggest the 9/11 attacks acted as a “transformative moment in (the) Arab-American 




 The Israeli and Palestinian collective consciousness’s provide a mirror to the American 
collective consciousness post-9/11 attacks where the philosophy creates a “cultural and moral 
superiority.” This romantic ideology lets the collective focus more on victimhood and the 
demonization of the enemy. In this pattern there is not only self-worth or evaluation expressions, 
but also vilification of the enemy in every way, including the physical stereotype. Schivelbusch 
describes the defeated perceptions of the “Yankee in the American South,” “Prussian German in 
France,” and the “Afro-French in the Rhineland,” “all conform to the negative stereotype of the 
savage”. “With his hulking size, animalistic physiognomy, searing, glare, coal-black beard and 
weapon bared in his hand, menaces defenseless women and children…”
72
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 This bears a striking resemblance to the cultural stereotypes the government portrayed in 
public awareness campaigns warning the public directly after the 9/11 attacks.
73
 When the 
collective deems the enemy as animal-like, devolved cave dwellers, with savage tendencies it is 
easy to retain a moral superiority. It is also easier to vilify the enemy- but more dangerously the 
culture and people in general- when they do not look like “us” at all. It is important to also note 
that before what Mubarak calls the “transformative moment” for the U.S. collective 
consciousness that was the 9/11 attacks, the foundation of this Occidental supremacy had already 
been developed as Shiraz Dossa claims in the West “anti-Muslim disdain is driven by both racial 
and class antipathy… anti-Muslim disdain has been incorporated within the settler logic of 
white supremacy. Muslims have been demoted to the lowest of the low.”  
 Between historical views and then a much more powerful and focusing event like the 
9/11 attacks it is clear the American collective consciousness grasped onto this idea of Neo-
orientalism that allows for apt contextualization in Schivelbusch’s “Losers in Battle, Winners in 
Spirit” archetype. 
 This portrayal of the enemy allows the narrative to latch onto a traditional good vs. evil 
model. Interestingly, up until this point the archetype for the villain or evildoer In American 
culture has historically taken on German or more accurately Aryan aesthetic due to WWII.
74
 
Recently this Nazi archetype villain has been replaced by the “jihadi,” or commonly some 
variation on the Muslim radical, extremist, or terrorist in popular fiction. This change clearly 
reflects the general populace’s attitude about who is the major threat or “enemy of America.”  
 This visual stereotype of Muslims is of course a generalization and an issue in its own 
right, but it also creates larger problems. By creating a superiority complex and a superiority 
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perspective, Americans are not granting respect to the perceived enemy, which is a poor strategic 
choice. Disregarding the enemy because of difference in appearance or tactics is a mistake made 
many times in war. With Sun Tzu’s memorable quote in mind, “Know your enemy and know 
yourself, find naught in fear for 100 battles. Know yourself but not your enemy, find level of loss 
and victory.”
75
 Lacking an awareness and respect for your enemy and their capability is a 
dangerous concept. It is important to realize that the superiority complex and generalizations 
about the enemy may serve to boost confidence and morale, but can have tragic results again if 




 In this archetype, the defeated state now seeks to pay back the enemy. Schivelbusch 
terms this “unyielding reciprocity” with a higher degree of engagement based on the level of 
pain, injustice, or violence inflicted.
77
 In the American context this was played out in “Operation 
Enduring Freedom,” which included military action in the Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq. 
While the war in Afghanistan targeted the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, it did not “act out” 
like a classical war narrative with easily graspable victories and therefore Americans were 
unable to perceive or enjoy the necessary catharsis that is usually granted in a classic war. The 
Iraq war provided a more traditional war which Schivelbusch portrays as “The motivations for 
revenge- restitution for an injustice, punishment for acts of violence- were codified into laws of 
‘legitimate’ warfare. At the same time war itself was rationalized, refined, made to obey 
rules…”
78
 The war in Iraq provided the country a noble and civilized catharsis after the 9/11 
attacks. The public was able to see an enemy they were told was linked to the 9/11 attacks 
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vanquished and territory taken reminiscent of the classic battles of modernity to which 
Clausewitz was a witness.  
 This catharsis is necessary to relieve what Schivelbusch terms “the neurosis of the 
individual” and “the myth of denial of defeat to the larger collective.” Until catharsis is reached 
this denial of defeat mythology serves an important purpose as it provides “Psychological 
mechanisms for coming to terms with defeat… healthful protective shields or buffer zones- 
emotional fortresses- against a reality unbearable to the psyche.”
79
 While the myth fallacies serve 
an important role to help the American collective consciousness by providing both a shield and 
distraction until revenge or revanche can be accomplished, this mentality is also dangerous in a 
truer sense as there is a lack of real comprehension as an effect, which Issa Khalaf outlines in 
“America’s collective denial of 9/11’s meaning:” 
So politically and militarily appropriated has the event (9/11) become, and so 
mixed has it been with national revenge, vindictiveness, and mission to counteract 
no less than the devil himself, that we have gone morally astray. The event is the 
establishment’s rallying cry for collective unity and purpose… and hardly for 
rethinking policies and America’s social order.
80
 
Khalaf discerns how dangerous this archetype can be. Despite the emotional buffering or 
shielding it provides, it also prevents the collective consciousness from truly coming to terms 
with the reality of what has happened in defeat.  
 The essential takeaway is that from a historical perspective, the war that actually targeted 
the perpetrators and sympathizers or safe-haven providers- the war in Afghanistan- was unable to 
provide the psychological revenge and revanche desired. The Iraq War, despite not targeting the 
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perpetrators of 9/11, for a brief time gave the collective conscious catharsis through the provision 
of a classic war that fit the American perception of what war should be, which most notably 
featured the conquering of a state and removal of its leader.  
From Revanche to Unconditional Surrender  
 In the Revenge and Revanche archetype there is a historically noble or “by the rules” 
exchange. That is, there is the same respect for your opponent and their society in the same way 
two duelists must have a mutual respect for each other before entering into such an agreement. In 
this archetype we see a move from revanche to unconditional surrender or total war. In the case 
of the U.S. and Al Qaeda, the revanche archetype was never truly realized as Al Qaeda is a 
stateless entity which in reality never took, or conquered any geographic space and likewise do 
not truly have any land to be conquered. As there was no nobility credited to Al Qaeda by 
America, and the additional lack of opportunity for true revanche, unconditional surrender and 
total war became the only option. Schivelbusch provides an apt definition of total war:  
In total war, military confrontations are fought no longer between mutually 
respectful warrior castes… see the adversary as the incarnation of evil, an 
archenemy with whom there can be no common ground or compromise. The only 
option is to destroy or at least permanently incapacitate the enemy.
81
   
 This total war was not manifested out of the U.S. need for revenge, but in fact out of the 
Al Qaeda mission statement. As stated earlier, there is no room for civil accords with this enemy. 
Al Qaeda seeks to completely destroy Western civilization in every form. Because of the 
barbarism of the attack, a terrorist one targeting civilians, it would be safe to assume that in 
addition to their stateless agency the U.S would approach the situation from a total war 
perspective even if Al Qaeda hadn’t already set this precedent with their mission statement. 
                                                        




  Even with the many victories and “captures or kills” of Al Qaeda leadership there is no 
real celebration or return to national pride. The only exception may be the killing of Osama bin 
Laden, in which masses turned out in New York City and Washington D.C. to celebrate.
82
 
Osama bin Laden did provide, and in many ways rightfully so, one of the few identifiable targets 
to focus the nation’s collective ire on. His death did not take place for many years after the 9/11 
attacks and previous to that event the victory in the Iraq war had provided only a brief victory the 
American collective consciousness desperately desired. The conquer and takeover of the entire 
state of Iraq, including the capture of their leader Saddam Hussein, gave the American people the 
ceremony and theatre of defeat that the war in Afghanistan could not provide. Schivelbusch uses 
Eric L. McKitrick’s succinct definition to explain this phenomenon:  
The victor needs to be assured that his triumph has been invested with the  fullest 
spiritual ceremonial meaning… The conquered enemy must be prepared to give 




Even in bin Laden’s death there was a lack of imagery or graspable material to make the event 
feel truly real or impressionistic to create the “act out of defeat” for the American public that it 
witnessed in Iraq. The Iraq war fulfilled McKitrick’s definition both in the American celebration 
and the capture of Saddam Hussein seen in Figures 2 and 3.
84
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Figure 2, 3 
 
 To this day, the total war objective to eradicate the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan 
has not been completed. While operations in Iraq continued for years after the “Mission 
Accomplished” speech and Saddam Hussein’s capture, at that moment in time they provided the 
total war victories the United States desperately needed after the collective anger, 
embarrassment, and anxiety the 9/11 attacks had brought upon the nation.  
Renewal  
 In the Renewal stage the nation looks inward and appreciates defeat and war as a 
purifying or destined status in which consolation and meaning can be gleaned from the events.
85
 
In the United States this purification or consolation came in the unification of a truly polarized 
nation following the controversial and contested election of George W. Bush, who lost the 
popular vote in the 2000 presidential election. In defeat the country unified in their sorrow, 
commiseration, and anger at an enemy that had not manifested itself in such a way a since the 
attack on Pearl Harbor.
86
 
 This unification and self-realization also led to what Schivelbusch likens to a crucifixion 
or martyr-like state that allowed the U.S. to pursue global initiatives with a moral superiority, 
knowing nations would be hard pressed to defy the global hegemon especially after such a large 
                                                        
85 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat, 30.  
86 “9/11 brought us together, but what is it unity?” The Gazette (Sept. 11, 2011), http://thegazette.com/2011/09/11/911-brought-




scale and public attack against them. Issa Khalaf takes a critical gaze at this martyr-like 
collective consciousness:  
It’s as if America found its own holocaust to sacralize, our victimhood and 
innocence plain to see, the victims and event of 9/11, carved in history, 
transcending, out-historicizing all other political, military, terroristic, and natural 
tragedies…We insist on innocence above all else. To fixate on proving our 




 Khalaf finds the American collective consciousness exemplifying Schivelbuschian 
emotional responses both in victimhood, but also in a sense of moral superiority. Schivelbusch 
describes this self-realization and the following determination that the defeated state is the 
natural choice to fight back:  
It is a short step form understanding defeat as an act of purification, humility, and 
sacrifice- a crucifixion of sorts- to laying claim to spiritual and moral leadership 
in world affairs…Who, they reasoned was better equipped to act as moral 




 With this thought process the United States saw it as destiny to take the leadership role in 
attacking Al Qaeda, not only because of their military power, and hegemonic role as “police” for 
the world, but from a deeper more existential justification. Again Khalaf captures the mood of 
the collective consciousness quite aptly:  
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(Americans) restate our core mythology: strength in fear, not forgetting but 
moving on, finding hope from tragedy, maintaining the American way, belief in 
God and his blessing, American exceptionalism… “We are all Americans” is 
perceived as authenticating our response to the attackers and sundry associated 




The U.S. collective consciousness perceived 9/11 as a crucifixion, and in their revitalization and 
self-realization they now had as Schivelbusch states a “spiritual and moral leadership in world 
affairs,” to take on and defeat the enemy that was Al Qaeda and “global terrorism.” 
Conclusion  
 The goal of this section was to create a better understanding of the collective trauma and 
consciousness of the United States in response to the 9/11 attacks. Schivelbusch’s  “Culture of 
Defeat” encourages an understanding of the American experience by contextualizing it in a 
historical archetype theory. While the 9/11 attacks are not the same kind of total defeat that 
Scvhivelbusch uses in his theory, it is the conclusion of this section that the emotional and 
collective trauma of the United States is similar enough to make this a reasonable and valid 
comparison or contextualization.  
 The 9/11 attacks were not on the scale of the total defeat examples that Schivelbusch uses 
in his theory, but it is still analogous to the emotional patterns exemplified in Scvhivelbusch’s 
theory, including all but one of the defined archetypes. Due to the nature of the attacks 
(terrorism) and the lack of a classic invasion, I conclude that the attacks created a modern form 
of the “Culture of Defeat” in the context that while not suffering a total defeat, the same 
collective psychological response is apparent.  
                                                        




 With this modern “Culture of Defeat” contextualization and understanding, the 
romanticized American response to the 9/11 attacks is now more comprehensible. The “Culture 
of Defeat” archetypes make sense out of the American collective consciousness and one of the 




Section II: Fallacy and Misperception 
 
We have rediscovered the roots of our national character, which are an unshakeable confidence 
in the rightness of our mission, deep religious conviction, and a unique ability to come together 
to prevail against frightening obstacles... Next time, we must dismiss those who tell us that all 
people are the same, all cultures are of equal worth, all values are relative, and all judgments 
are to be avoided. 
-Michael Leeden days after the first American attack in Afghanistan 
  
 The post 9/11 narrative has been evolving since its creation to the present day. What 
started with the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) with George W. Bush is now called the 
Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) with the Obama administration. What remains constant 
is the overall U.S. strategy of hunting to capture and kill terrorists around the world. In light of 
the 9/11 attacks and the GWOT narrative, we see a policy imposed on a susceptible and 
traumatized public. David Ciunk summarizes this new vulnerable position:  
To say it differently, many Americans in the post-9/11 world supported policies 
that had “un-American” values and ideals at their core –policies that severely 
limited personal freedoms and civil liberties with an eye toward increasing 
security.
90
   
The new rhetoric not only limited civil liberties, but also set a course for Western misperception, 
“Islamophobia,” the war in Iraq, and no rationally attainable benchmarks for success. With the 
Obama administration and OCO we see a change in title and public rhetoric towards Islam and 
the Middle East, but the continuation of tactics and in fact an increase in targeted strikes.  
The purpose of this section is to analyze the GWOT and to process the effects of this 
rhetoric. While there have been many successes in the fight against Al Qaeda, including the 
                                                        






prevention of any complex attacks on the American homeland since 9/11
91
, it is important to 
understand how the GWOT was fallacious, strategically irrational and led to misperceptions that 
have made the United States ill-informed and in many ways out of touch with the reality of 
countering terrorism around the globe.  
 The GWOT narrative is a fallacy in many ways, but none is more fundamental than the 
name itself. In fact, the term is as illogical as stating that it is the global war against “flanking an 
enemy” or “blitzkrieg.” Terrorism is not an ideology, terrorism is not a strategy, and it is not 
exclusive to Al Qaeda or Muslim radicals. Terrorism is a tactic that can be, and is, used all over 
the world, by different cultures, groups, states, religions, and causes. Using the same definition 
previously applied in Section I, “The use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political 
aims.”
92
 It is impossible to fight a war against it, although President Bush seemed to think 
otherwise.   
 On September 16, 2001, in a speech at Camp David, President Bush said, "This crusade - 
this war on terrorism - is going to take a while."
93
 In this quote we see the war on terrorism 
fallacy born, but also the indication of a West vs. Muslim framing by making reference to the 
Crusades. While this may be considered a subjective comment, there is no denying the care and 
thought that goes into a president’s speech and that the use of the word “crusade” could clearly 
be interpreted with a religious context. This was the case as Bush later apologized for the 
comment, but the foundation was laid and it was a clear indication of the framing that the 
administration was applying even if the rhetoric would be less apparent in the future. President 
Bush continued this sentiment in addressing a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001 
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when he said, “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end 
until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”
94
 In this quote 
Bush’s policy is revealed to not only target Al Qaeda, but also “every terrorist group of global 
reach.” From a foreign policy perspective renowned academic Walter Russell Mead would 
classify this kind of ideology as Jacksonian. In an interview he described Jacksonian war policy 
as:  
Jacksonians: when somebody attacks the hive, you come swarming out of the hive and 
you sting them to death. And Jacksonians, when it comes to war, [they] don't believe in 
limited wars. They don't believe, particularly, in the laws of war. War is about fighting, 
killing, and winning with as few casualties as possible on your side. But you don't worry 
about casualties on the other side. That's their problem. They shouldn't have started the 
war if  they didn't want casualties.
95
 
With Mead’s definition the GWOT rhetoric is Jeffersonian in nature with a policy that has a 
stated goal not only to degrade terrorist groups, but to eradicate every single one from the face of 
the earth.   
The Bush administration cast America and Americans as the heroes fighting on behalf of 
all that is good, with a clear subtext of also being the Judeo-Christian or Occidental side, while 
the terrorists were far reaching and all over the globe, and happened to be “Oriental” or 
perceived Muslims.
96
 While not outright said, the insinuation is clear. If America wasn’t just 
fighting Al Qaeda, but a global enemy, and not a state, there was only one unifying factor: Islam. 
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Even the initial name for the military operation, “Infinite Justice,” in response to the 9/11 attacks 
had a religious connotation. One that offended Muslims as “finality” is a concept that only god 
can provide and was quickly changed to the more inoffensive “Enduring Freedom.”
97
 
 The rhetoric from the Bush administration was not just erroneous from a scholarly level. 
The fallacies built into the speeches, policy, and administration’s generalizations led to serious 
consequences that still affect America and the world today. In researching what effect the 
GWOT had on the American collective consciousness and policy, there were three distinct 
results that deserve specific focus, including: the manifestation of “Islamophobia,” or an intense 
fear/hatred of Muslims; an anxious, frustrated and fearful American collective consciousness due 
to the unrealistic and unattainable goals of the GWOT; and the war in Iraq and its distraction 
from true counter-terrorism initiatives in Afghanistan. 
 In the days following the 9/11 attacks there was a sharp increase in hate crimes towards 
Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and people that “looked suspicious” or, in other words, like they were 
Arab or the misperceived and generalized views of what Muslims or Arabs look like. According 
to the FBI religious based hate-crime increased 1600% after the 9/11 attacks.
98
 Fortunately these 
attacks and intimidation incidents were not serious in that they did not result in more violent hate 
crimes or murder. President Bush cannot be blamed for this instantaneous reaction and it should 
be noted that the Bush administration consciously worked to combat Islamophobia in some 
respects.  
In coordination with Islamic organizations, President Bush attempted to make it clear that 
Muslims should not be targeted or blamed for the attacks on 9/11. On September 17, he visited 
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the Washington DC Islamic Center and met with prominent Muslim leaders, which included 
accepting a Qu’ran. On September 20, Bush gave two speeches to a joint session of Congress in 
which he denounced any intimidation or scapegoating against Arabs, Sikh, or Muslims. He went 
on to blame Osama bin Laden for appropriating the religion for his own interests.
99
 Even critics 
must acknowledge these actions and a continuance of them throughout his tenure, but at the same 
time it should be noted that the administration contradicted this message with actions and policy. 
The overriding message was clear that the American collective should place their fear, anxiety 
and blame on Muslims writ large.   
 In section I there was reference to Jason Thompson’s research into The Bush 
administration’s sub textual “othering” between the Occidental and the Oriental that led to 
Islamophobia. Altwaiji, Mubarak also touches on this ideology and it’s Islamophobic effect: 
The 9/11 attacks and the so-called “War on Terror” brought the Middle East and 
the classic Orientalist discourse, with its binary division of “us” and “them” into 
focus once more. Therefore, representations of Arab Muslims become more 
prevalent in post-9/11 politics, and terrorism becomes the most available term for 
labeling this group of people. The war on terrorism does not only involve a fight 
against Arab terrorists but also dedicates great efforts for observing and keeping 
an eye on every Muslim…
100
 
While President Bush personally made efforts to combat Islamophobic sentiments via outreach 
initiatives, the overarching GWOT narrative overshadowed these efforts by creating a distinct 
schism with the “us” and “them” or an “Occidental vs. the Oriental” ideology. Mubarak finds 
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that the GWOT not only pushed the global war and fear of Muslims abroad, but also a distrust of 
Muslims in the West.  
 In researching Islamophobia in America, Jennifer Young found that public awareness and 
media campaigns created a stereotype that only Middle-Eastern looking men were identifiable as 
terrorists.
101
 Young points to the infamous “Faces of Global Terrorism” poster (below) 
accompanied by various photos of predominantly Middle Eastern and South/East Asian men 
with bounty’s for their capture.  
 
Figure 3 
While accurate that these men are terrorists, it does little service to the public in reality except 
creating an Islamophobic fear of Middle Eastern looking men:  
It is the work of this poster and other “national security” propaganda and rhetoric 
that has become institutionalized into the American system that has allowed 
people to think such a formula for finding “terrorists” exists. This poster and 
others like it have worked to create stereotypes, racism, and prejudices across the 
United States in the aftermath of September 11th.
102
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Young finds that this poster and similar media campaigns as part of the GWOT plan 
helped to create major harmful changes in how Americans viewed Middle Easterners and 
Muslims, otherwise known as “Islamophobia.”
103
  
The GWOT narrative and the Bush administration also inspired Islamophobic sentiments 
in the United States with the initiation of the war in Iraq, pitting the country against a Muslim 
state. A 2006 Washington Post-ABC News poll shows the rising distrust and negative views of 
Muslims, even in comparison to the days directly after the 9/11 attacks.  The results showed that 
“nearly half of Americans -- 46 percent -- have a negative view of Islam, seven percentage points 
higher than in the tense months after the Sept. 11, 2001.”
104
  
The most damning evidence comes in that the percentage of Americans who believed 
Islam inspired violence against non-Muslims increased more than double from 14 percent in 
January 2002 to 33 percent in March of 2006.
105
 This last statistic is especially noteworthy; in 
the immediate aftermath of 9/11 there was less suspicion of Islam inspiring violence against non-
Muslims than five years after the attacks. The conclusion is that the GWOT narrative, through its 
message and initiation of the war in Iraq, had manifested even more fear and distrust of Muslims 
than the actual 9/11 attacks had created.
106
  
The second area where the GWOT narrative created a serious fallacy was in generalizing 
the enemy as a global and all-encompassing threat the United States would eradicate while also 
supplying the epic “us vs. them” myth or narrative at the same time. This epic “plot” played on 
the post-9/11 collective consciousness- which had become more romantic than rational- and was 
only magnified by the media, which constantly promoted the “us vs. them” narrative and played 
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on the fears of another terrorist attack. This artificial narrative of the global threat to be 
eradicated and “us vs. them” created by the GWOT was sensationalistic and simple, which made 
for a perfect product to sell to the American public. At the same time it created another error in 
the GWOT narrative, which was creating unrealistic or unattainable goals that the American 
collective consciousness strived for after it had accepted this narrative. In 2015 these goals have 
still not been accomplished, keeping the collective consciousness in a state of flux and anxiety.   
Eric Miller explores the American emotional response to the 9/11 attacks in the 
immediacy as well as a decade later. He finds that because of these unrealistic goals of 
eradicating terrorism worldwide, not even the death of Osama bin Laden gave true closure:  
Bin Laden's death does not guarantee a lasting "peace." If anything, it suggests 
that America still struggles to understand Islamic nationalism." The events of 
September 11, 2001, ultimately may be thought of as part of a broader war on 
terrorism with… no discernible endgame.
107
 
Additionally, Jeffrey Record suggests that the GWOT is “dangerously indiscriminate and 
ambitious,” with no regard for the reality of the American security and defense complex and 
what it can accomplish.
108
  
In light of Record and Miller’s examinations it can be said that the sale of the narrative 
was easy, but that delivering on the promises made was unrealistic and, more importantly, 
created a state of anxiety over terrorism fears that are still prevalent 15 years later.  
The GWOT narrative may be the impetus for this relentless anxiety, but it is also 
important to examine the media’s role in selling this narrative. The entertainment world took 
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advantage of a new organic and recognizable enemy to place fears and hatred towards instead of 
promoting understanding as described by former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski:  
The entertainment industry has also jumped into the act. Hence the TV serials and 
films in which the evil characters have recognizable Arab features, sometimes 
highlighted by religious gestures that exploit public anxiety and stimulate 
Islamophobia. Arab facial stereotypes, particularly in newspaper cartoons, have at 




 The creator of counter-terrorism drama “24” commented “[24 was] ripped out of the zeitgeist of 
what people’s fears are – their paranoia that we’re going to be attacked.”
110
 Additionally, Amy 
Zalman and Jonathan Clarke of the Carnegie Council found that the ceaseless reporting on the 
omnipresent threat of another terrorist attack served as “fuel on the fire” as an already 
traumatized collective consciousness was constantly reminded of the wars and security issues the 
United States faced: 
Through incessant television coverage of the attacks and their aftermath, the 
evolution of homeland security, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and policies 
and statements issuing from Washington, the media helped create the atmosphere 




 Through the Bush administration’s message of a global war on terrorism and the constant 
media bombardment with the threat of terrorist attacks and coverage of two wars, the American 
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collective consciousness- and it’s anxious state- needed to see a finite victory. Realistically, this 
was a victory that was neither reachable nor logistically reasonable, as the Bush administration 
set out not just to defeat Al Qaeda, but “Global Terrorism,” which is not something that a state 
can sensibly defeat. This leaves the American collective consciousness attempting to reconcile 
with a state of constant war, and the anxiety of an ever-present terrorist threat. This sentiment is 
felt so collectively that, according to Greg Jaffe, peace has become a “dirty word,” and the idea 
of America’s wars ending are considered “quixotic or naïve” by the public.
112
  
The consequences of the GWOT narrative for the U.S. consciousness are palpable, but 
the Iraq war is the most comprehensively destructive aspect of the GWOT. The Iraq war is only 
second to the 9/11 attacks when it comes to press coverage, scrutiny, and the toll it has taken on 
the collective American consciousness.  The war has produced over 500,000 casualties and will 
continue to produce civilian deaths with the sectarian violence that was born out of a weak 
federal government and tribal or religious differences.
113
  
The Iraq war, psychologically speaking, gave the American public a construct to express 
their collective anger, hate, and desire for revenge in a classical sense that the operations in 
Afghanistan were unable to provide. This is because the generalized war (GWOT) the Bush 
administration had sold the public allowed for any state or group to become an enemy quite 
easily. Outside of the incorrect definition inherent in GWOT, using it as a bridge to Iraq is the 
most egregious aspect of the Bush administration’s narrative.  
At this point it should be noted that this work does not look to criticize the intelligence 
community or their intelligence on whether or not Iraq had WMDs, but more the convenience at 
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which the Bush administration was able to tie Iraq into the war against terrorism. This was 
accomplished by stretching the definition of terrorism and linking Iraq and a possible WMD 
threat within the narrative that contributed to the public’s already amplified fear, allowing the 
Bush administration to target Iraq.  
The key to invading Iraq rested on tying Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi state to the 9/11 
attacks. As the war began in March of 2003, it was sold to the American public by claiming that 
Saddam Hussein both had WMDs and was connected to Al Qaeda.
114
 There is evidence that the 
administration looked to target the Iraqi state for invasion before the 9/11 attacks, and then 
actively tied the state to Al Qaeda before there was any credible evidence to support such a 
claim.
115
 Alastair Finlan details principal Bush administration figures including the Secretary of 
Defense, State, Vice President, and President himself discussing plans to invade Iraq as early as 
weeks after the 9/11 attacks.
116
 
Paul Pillar, a former CIA analyst, provides further context, stating that the 9/11 attacks 
“made it politically possible for the first time to persuade the American people to break a 
tradition of not launching offensive wars.”
117
 The Iraq sub-narrative to the GWOT was not only 
fed to the American public, but to Congress as well, which can be seen in President Bush’s letter 
to Congress requesting the use of force against Iraq:  
(2) Acting pursuant to the Constitution and Public Law 107-243 is consistent 
with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions 
against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, 
                                                        
114 “How the Bush administration sold the Iraq war,” MSNBC (March 22, 2013), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how-the-bush-
administration-sold-the-iraq-war (visited March 17, 2014). 
115 Ibid. 
116 Alastair Finlan, Contemporary Military Strategy and the Global War on Terror (Bloomsbury 2014): 89-90. 




organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.
118
 
This is possibly the most direct and clear evidence of the Bush administration using the GWOT 
narrative as a justification for the Iraq war as it is a formal request to Congress to invade Iraq 
because of its role in the 9/11 attacks. While the administration did its best to tie Iraq to Al 
Qaeda, President Bush reconciled the two as both equally worthy opponents or transgressors in 
the war against terrorism, even if they were not formally connected collaborators, stating, “You 
can’t distinguish between al-Qaida and Saddam when you talk about the war on terrorism. 
They’re both equally as bad, and equally as evil, and equally as destructive.”
119
  
 The 9/11 attacks and GWOT narrative were used as a justification for the Iraq invasion, 
but the GWOT narrative was also used when public support for the war began to falter. As 
criticism mounted, the administration relied upon the terrorist narrative again. In 2005, regarding 
the withdrawal from Iraq, President Bush made the case that “[Insurgents would] use the vacuum 
created by an American retreat to gain control of a country, a base from which to launch attacks 
and conduct their war against non-radical Muslim governments.”
120
 The administration would 
tout this narrative to the point of hyperbole by making Iraq and not Afghanistan the epicenter of 
terrorism. President Bush stated, “the fight against terrorism must continue there because it is the 
center of a terrorist movement to intimidate the whole world.”
121
 This was an inaccurate 
exaggeration as well as an artificial push to house the Iraq war squarely into the GWOT narrative 
when it truly did not fit. The recent developments with ISIS in Iraq and Syria could be argued to 
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support the Bush theory, but in effect the current situation would not have come to light if there 
were no invasion in Iraq to begin with and at the time of statement these developments had not 
yet occurred. 
 The justification for the war in Iraq was to fight terrorism, but really the Iraq war served 
to make the “fight against terrorism” (in reality Al Qaeda) more difficult. Alastair Finlan 
provides concrete evidence of the operational distraction the war caused, quoting General 
Franks:  
On the morning of November 27, 2001 I received an unexpected call from 
Secretary Rumsfeld. At the time I was working with Gene Renuart and the 
operations staff on air support for Afghan units pushing into the Spin Mountains 




This quote from General Franks provides undeniable evidence of the distraction, even in the 
immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, that the Iraq war would cause. Secretary Gates, in his 
memoir Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, explicitly states that the war in Iraq seriously 
undermined what he viewed as the crucial war that was occurring in Afghanistan: 
President Bush always detested the notion, but our later challenges in Afghanistan 
especially the return of the Taliban in force by the time I reported for duty were, I 
believe, significantly compounded by the invasion of Iraq. Resources and senior-
level attention were diverted from Afghanistan. U.S. goals in Afghanistan were 
                                                        




embarrassingly ambitious and historically naive compared with the meager 
human and financial resources committed to the task, at least before 2009.
123
 
In Gates’ statement one not only sees the distraction that was the Iraq war, but also a 
reference to the other distinct effect of the GWOT, which is unrealistic counter-terrorism goals. 
In his review of the Secretary Gates’ memoir, Michael Hirsch succinctly summarizes Gates 
criticism of the Iraq war: 
Iraq was a serious diversion from the ongoing stabilization of Afghanistan, where 
the actual culprits of 9/11 were hiding out; and 2) that the effort to destroy al-
Qaida and round up Osama bin Laden and his leadership team was seriously 
underfunded and suffered from far too little attention.
124
  
General Franks and Secretary of Defense Gates’ views on the distraction that the war in Iraq 
caused to true counter-terrorism initiatives is clear, but they are not the only senior officials that 
were critical. Brent Scowcroft, Zbigniew Brzezinski and former secretary of state Madeleine 
Albright all argued:  
(The) Al-Qaeda threat was much more immediate, dangerous, and difficult to 
defeat. They feared that a war of choice against Iraq would weaken a war of 
necessity against al-Qaeda by distracting America’s strategic attention to Iraq, by 
consuming money and resources much better applied to homeland defense, and, 
because an American war on Iraq was so profoundly unpopular around the world, 
especially among Muslims, by weakening the willingness of key countries to 
share intelligence information so vital to winning the war on al-Qaeda.
125
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This consensus criticism from such esteemed foreign policy experts is more than convincing in 
supporting the idea that the war in Iraq distracted from real counter-terrorism initiatives. And 
like Hirsch abridging Secretary Gates, Jeffrey Record is able to summarize the aforementioned 
key foreign policy and national security figures’ sentiments aptly:  
In conflating Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, the 
administration unnecessarily expanded the GWOT by launching a preventive war 
against a state that was not at war with the United States and that posed no direct 
or imminent threat to the United States at the expense of continued attention and 
effort to protect the United States from a terrorist organization with which the 
United States was at war. 
From operational, strategic, funding, intelligence sharing, and a multitude of other facets, it is 
clear that the Iraq war as part of the GWOT narrative served as a serious distraction from true 
counter-terrorism efforts.  
 In addition to taking valuable resources and planning elements away from the war in 
Afghanistan, the Iraq war had many unintended consequences that made the global counter-
terrorism mission more difficult by creating tension with the Muslim world writ large. Jessica 
Stern describes how the Iraq invasion increased support for the terrorist cause:  
The unprovoked attack on Iraq, followed by an occupation that is widely 
perceived as inept and arbitrary…has confirmed this view among potential 
sympathizers. Every time American troops shoot into a crowd, even in self-
defense, the image of America as a reckless, ruthless oppressor is highlighted.
126
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Stern also quotes Saudi dissident Saad al-Faqih as he adds that the Iraq war was a “gift” to Al 
Qaeda and Osama bin Laden by helping to increase empathy and support for their movement, in 
effect becoming a helpful recruitment tool.
127
 The Iraq war created an unintentional narrative that 
took America from universally accepted victim to imperialistic and unprovoked menace to Islam 
and the Middle East.  
 The Iraq war created more sympathy and, as a product, recruits for Islamic terrorist 
organizations, took valuable resources away from the war in Afghanistan, and also served to 
create a weakened state where it is possible for terrorist organizations to flourish and strengthen, 
as is the current state in Iraq with the terrorist organization ISIL.  These outcomes from the war 
in Iraq are proof that the war itself and as a product of the GWOT narrative only served to harm 
true counter-terrorism initiatives.  
 In all fairness, the GWOT has been successful in taking out Al Qaeda leadership, 
including Osama Bin Laden, and preventing another major scale terrorist attack in the United 
States. These are no small tasks and must be appreciated, but could these accomplishments still 
have been met without the negative secondary effects? This question can never be answered 
fairly, but it is the conclusion of this section that the GWOT narrative led to three distinct 
consequences outlined in this section that all serve as a serious detriment to the U.S. foreign 
policy, the public consciousness, and counter-terrorism efforts. 
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Section III: Crafting the Anti-narrative 
 
 Not only is the GWOT narrative a fallacy, but it has also done a disservice to the 
American public. Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski opines on the GWOT 
narrative and its effect on the American populace:  
The “war on terror” has created a culture of fear in America. The Bush 
administration's elevation of these three words into a national mantra since the 
horrific events of 9/11 has had a pernicious impact on American democracy, on 
America's psyche and on U.S. standing in the world. Using  this phrase has 
actually undermined our ability to effectively confront the real challenges we face 
from fanatics who may use terrorism against us.
128
 
 Brzezinski aptly identifies the major issues with this narrative thrust upon the American 
populace. U.S. President Obama effectively ended this narrative in May of 2013, stating, “The 
‘Global War on Terror‘ is over.”
129
 In addition to ending the use the GWOT title, President 
Obama also served to end the “us vs. them” global narrative, stating, “we must define our effort 
not as a boundless ‘Global War on Terror,’ but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to 
dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America.”
130
 This change in 
policy signifies the Obama administration’s realization that a new narrative was necessary, 
which is supplanted by the work to close Guantanamo Bay, withdrawal from Iraq, and the 
increased engagement with the Muslim world globally and domestically to change the perceived 
imperialist and “Islamophobic” nature that had been developed previously with the GWOT 
narrative.  
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With these changes the GWOT has become the Overseas Contingency Operations 
(OCO).  In this name change there is still an issue. On the working level, the Obama 
administration has acknowledged that the Al Qaeda central structure has been dismantled. They 
are now essentially a “glocal” organization that lends support to regional and state insurgencies. 
But with this working level acknowledgement of the loose to non-existent connection among 
insurgencies there is still the blanket narrative of “Overseas Contingency Operations” that still 
creates a subconscious connection to the previous fallacious global war (GWOT) or overarching 
narrative despite the fact that these are operations that are “targeted efforts to dismantle specific 
networks of violent extremists that threaten America.”
131
  
While Overseas Contingency Operations is properly vague, inoffensive, and bureaucratic, 
it still exists. It is the conclusion of this chapter that there should be no blanket narrative that 
covers counter-terrorism operations. Each operation requires a unique approach, attitude, and 
strategy and should not be tied in with other initiatives.  
Instead of OCO or any other name, there should be the creation of the anti-narrative, or 
devolution of the overarching and global effort to further distance the American collective 
consciousness from the epic “global war” and crusade-type mythology.  In effect, each regional 
or terrorist threat should be handled completely separately and devoid of connection unless there 
is a true one. This anti-narrative would serve to finally eradicate any overarching themes or 
connections to the GWOT fallacy. By destroying the overarching narrative, the perception 
should change to a viewpoint where each unique and different issue is approached in that respect, 
as a unique situation.  
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With this approach the hope is that this will allow the American public to be completely 
removed from their recent “Culture of Defeat” past and the GWOT narrative in its entirety. In 
doing this, the collective consciousness can also begin to return to a more rational ideology as 
opposed to the emotional romantic period that was fueled by the attacks on 9/11 and subsequent 
GWOT narrative. Being close to 15 years removed from the 9/11 attacks, it is now time for the 
American country as a populace, government, and military to transition out of the “Culture of 
Defeat” narrative in its psychology, military operations, and cultural lens. With a new outlook 
the United States can begin to understand the greater context of the role it plays in the world and 




Section IV: Conclusion  
 
 The object of this chapter is two-fold in answering the question, “What effect did the 9/11 
attacks have on the United States collective consciousness as well as counter-terrorism policy?” 
The first section sets out to contextualize the American collective consciousness manifested out 
of the shared traumatic experience from the 9/11 attacks. This task was accomplished using 
Schivelbusch, and applying a modern version of his “Culture of Defeat” model featuring seven 
of the eight classic archetypes or patterns that a state goes through after suffering a defeat. While 
“The Culture of Defeat” addresses the wars of early modernity between states (and one civil 
war), the research finds that the model is universal to a degree and can be applied to the 9/11 
attacks and its effect on the American collective consciousness. This chapter also offers a 
perspective on the American collective consciousness after such a momentous event in American 
history that allows the reader to see how the public was susceptible to influence and the fallacy 
of the GWOT narrative. It should also serve as a reference for future terrorist attacks as to how a 
state may respond collectively.   
 More important than the success of a scholarly comparison is the takeaway that 
Schivelbusch’s theory with minor adjustments or allowances for modernization- namely in the 
form of terrorist attacks- can be applied to cultures that suffer a modern version of defeat. With 
this knowledge, experts and hopefully the public writ large can be better informed and prepared 
for future instances, and avoid the pratfalls that a “Culture of Defeat” brings.  
 The second section of this chapter serves to dissect the fallacy of the GWOT narrative as 
well as analyze and explore the effect the narrative pushed on the American public and the 
world. This analysis should create clarity in four distinct areas. First, realizing the policy error in 




administration, through this narrative, amplified “Islamophobia” by creating an epic “us vs. 
them” mythos, painting terrorism as a Middle-Eastern-only practice, and entering a war against a 
Muslim country to which the American public was sold as supporting Al Qaeda and the 9/11 
attacks. Third, evidence has been provided to show that the war in Iraq was not only artificially 
forced into the GWOT narrative when it didn’t make sense, but that it also served to distract 
from true counter-terrorism operations by sucking resources from the Afghanistan war, creating 
an unstable state in Iraq (that manifested an environment for terrorism to flourish). Fourth, the 
GWOT narrative, while unintentional, served to create sympathy for the terrorist movement as 
the Muslim and Arab world perceived the Iraq invasion as an unprovoked destruction of a state.  
 In summation this chapter finds that in answering the question “What effect did the 9/11 
attacks have on the United States collective consciousness as well as counter-terrorism policy?” 
the research shows an American collective consciousness that became a modern “culture of 
Defeat” as a response to the 9/11 attacks. The research also provides that the GWOT policy 
served as a major detriment not only to the American public consciousness, but also to counter 
terrorism initiatives both in seeking the perpetrators of 9/11, but also in increasing anti-American 





Recommendations for the Evolution of American UAV Policy 
Introduction 
 Chapter I looked at the American journey from global hegemon to a modern  “Culture of 
Defeat” following the 9/11 attacks. In this context, it examined how this new collective 
consciousness allowed the Bush administration to push policy and ideology upon a romanticized 
collective based on fear and misinformation that in many ways was unsuccessful in countering 
terrorism around the world. While the senior leadership of Al Qaeda (AQ) was largely 
dismantled, it simultaneously adapted to U.S. initiatives by evolving from a top-heavy 
organization into a global movement with a focus on local insurgencies that look to fight 
Western powers in a much different manner than in the immediate post-9/11 strategic days. Al 
Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations have been incredibly successful with these new 
strategies in the Middle East and Africa. At the same time, the Obama administration has looked 
to evolve and adapt its defense and foreign relations policy- the most notable change to date 
would be ending the idea and term of the “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT). With a new plan 
called “Overseas Contingency Operations” (OCO), there is an acknowledgment that the war is 
not against terrorism itself, because terrorism is only a tactic and not a movement. With the 
Obama administration, there has also been an increase in the total number of UAV strikes, 
specifically in highly controversial “Signature Strikes,” or UAV attacks where the target is not 
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 While U.S. counter-terrorism operations have disrupted and destroyed the historical, or 
hierarchal, brand of AQ, it is clear that tangible terrorist threats exist and are creating instability 
all over the world.
133
 As such, they need to be addressed with a new strategy. OCO has become 
better at delineating the differences between each group and insurgency as well as trying to 
counter violent extremism through engagement and diplomacy, but at the same time there is 
much work to be done especially regarding UAV policy. This brings us to May 28, 2014.  
 On this date President Barack Obama delivered a speech to the graduating class at West 
Point Military Academy in upstate New York. The speech is notable because the President used 
it as the stage to announce major initiatives in American foreign and defense policy. In this 
speech, President Obama sought to clarify United States military policy:   
The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core 
interests demand it -- when our people are threatened; when our livelihoods are at  
stake; when the security of our allies is in danger.
134
 
President Obama went on to state that in pursuing peace and freedom beyond U.S. borders, not 
every problem should have a military solution.
135
 The President added that in situations of great 
concern for the entire international community that do not directly threaten American interests, 
the threshold for military action should be incredibly high and that diplomatic tools should 
always be exhausted before considering military options.
136
   
 One of the most important aspects of the speech was Obama’s acknowledgement that the 
threat of terrorism no longer came from a centralized AQ, but from local affiliates around the 
world. At the same time, he deemed terrorism to be the greatest threat to U.S. interests at home 
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 While this may have already been the case for an extended period of time, the 
administration’s public acknowledgement of this concept shows how seriously they take this new 
contextualized threat. In this light the President also announced that he would request Congress 
to approve a “Counter-Terrorism Partnerships Fund” at the cost of five billion dollars to help 
“train, build capacity, and facilitate partner countries on the front lines.”
138
 This announcement 
was followed by equally significant announcements regarding covert capture or kill operations.  
 The President made it clear that the new counter-terrorism fund would not eradicate the 
need for the United States to strike when there is actionable intelligence. Examples include 
capture missions- the capturing of Benghazi terrorist attack suspect Ahmed Abu Khatallah-
139
 or 
the use of UAV’s- to kill Maulvi Nazir, one of the top Taliban commanders in Pakistan.
140
 The 
President also acknowledged the need for reform of these operations, stating, “I also believe we 
need to be more transparent about both the basis of our actions, and the manner in which they are 
carried out whether it is drones strikes, or training partners.”
141
 This is noteworthy as many 
aspects of UAV policy right now contradict or fit poorly into the wider counter-terrorism 
mission, including diplomatic and countering-violent-extremism (CVE) initiatives that are being 
used to fight terrorist organizations. The acknowledgement that reform is necessary is key to 
moving forward in fighting terrorist organizations around the world.  
 The President’s speech will be the conceptual framework or impetus for the following 
chapter of this thesis. In this context it will address the President’s acknowledgement that covert 
operations- specifically UAV strikes- need to be reformed to become more effective to be a 
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successful part of the overall counter-terrorism initiative. This chapter will ask the question 
“How can the United States make UAV policy a more effective tool in countering terrorism?” In 
answering this research question this chapter will analyze scholarly articles, policy papers, 
studies, legislation, and expert accounts of UAV effects to create comprehensive policy 
recommendations that should serve to reform UAV initiatives.  
 The methodology will involve breaking research and recommendations into three distinct 
groups: strategic, operational, and tactical. From the Strategic perspective the focus will be on 
updating the Authorization For Use Of Military Force; creating transparency, oversight, and 
international norms, and integrating UAV Strikes into the larger U.S. counter-terrorism and 
foreign policy mission. Operationally the concentration will be on creating a Targeting Court 
based off of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, creating a UAV Fusion Center, 
and the move of all UAV strike operations to Department of Defense Jurisdiction. Tactically, 
“Signature Strikes” will be critically analyzed. Using this methodology for research, this chapter 
will seek to answer the question, “How can the United States make UAV policy a more effective 
tool in countering terrorism?”  
 Given the widespread implications of UAVs, including  ethical, legal, tactical, and 
morality issues, it is important to acknowledge the framework, or conceptual motivation, behind 
the authorization of such lethal and covert operations. With this in mind, it should be understood 
that these recommendations are made with the national security of the United States as the sole 
and primary objective. At the same time, many of these recommendations – while intended to 
make the United States more secure – should also improve ethical, legal, and transparency 
standards and enhance international cooperation. While improvements in these areas might 




motivation. If some of these recommendations increase international engagement, they would 
still be aimed at the end-goal of better enhancing U.S. national security and counter-terrorism 
initiatives.       
UAV Background  
 
 UAVs, or drones, are by definition “unmanned aerial vehicles.” They can fly 
autonomously or by pilots on the ground and are versatile in their capabilities. UAVs are most 
popular for their military use. From intelligence collection and surveillance to weapons 
deployment and reconnaissance, they have become an integral tool of the military and 
intelligence community. With the archaism of air-to-air combat, soaring prices, and delays in 
new jet fighter technology, UAVs have only become more essential to military strategy.
 142
 This 
importance and effectiveness is most apparent in both the Iraq War, and against terrorist 
organizations- specifically against Al Qaeda. In 2008, during the surge to quell violence in 
Baghdad, UAV flight hours went over 500,000 to match the increase of troops. These UAVs 
served various purposes.
143
 Take the Raven UAV, a 4-pound reconnaissance drone that can be 
launched by hand. In Iraq it logged nearly 300,000 hours by the end of 2008, and served as an 
important tool when soldiers required immediate assistance when pursuing insurgents or looking 
for IEDs.
144
 In Afghanistan from 2009 to 2010 drone use more than doubled, with the number of 
missile and bomb strikes reaching over 200 during that period. The increase was used as a 
counterinsurgency method to help lower civilian casualties.
145
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 As the war against Al Qaeda has progressed, the military has begun to adjust to the 
asymmetric nature of fighting a stateless terrorist group and the UAV has been, and continues to 
be, an integral part in fighting this war. It has been such a successful tool that it has become a 
focal point for fighting terrorism in both the Bush and Obama administrations. “Since 9/11, over 
95 percent of all non-battlefield targeted killing have been conducted by drones.”
146
 While the 
UAV programs at the Department of Defense (DOD) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
have been considered great successes in their cost effectiveness, intelligence collection, and 
strike capability, there are still major issues strategically, operationally, tactically, and politically.  
 Major issues include a lack of government oversight or transparency with the public and 
international community, questions about the ethical and morality of “Signature Strikes,” the 
lack of due process for American citizens abroad- the case of Anwar al-Awalki, the overall role 
of the CIA with regard to drone strikes, and how to create international norms or credibility for 
the use of drones. These concerns are serious and need to be addressed as the U.S. government 
continues to increase the use of UAVs abroad. If there is one certainty, it is that UAVs will be a 
part of the American future when it comes to countering terrorism, and will only play more of a 
role in military and intelligence operations going forward. 
Literature Review 
 
 In this chapter the major topic is the use of the UAVs as a weapon to counter terrorism. 
While this is a fairly modern subject, especially in scholarly terms, there is still an abundance of 
literature due to the important and controversial nature of this new technology.  This literature 
review is divided into three thematic sections based on the author’s position on UAV writ large: 
                                                        




neutral analysis and recommendations for UAVs; arguments for the use of UAVs; and arguments 
against the use of UAVs.  
Section I: Neutral Recommendations 
 In this section these articles give recommendations as to how UAV policy can be better, 
but at the same time are dispassionate about UAVs and their importance as compared to the other 
literature on the topic.  
 A Rand Corporation paper makes recommendations for UAV policy that should create a 
better program for U.S. security. Their recommendations include addressing how to use UAVs in 
the context of setting an example for international norms and to dissuade mistreatment by other 
states or actors. Additionally, they recognize the balance that must be struck between 
transparency and setting international norms, and the risk that this may have for current U.S. 
counterterrorism missions.
147
 This paper is important to the research as the recommendations 
come from the same perspective as this paper in that the recommendations are for U.S. national 
security above all else.  
 Like the Rand paper, Jane Davidson, in a report that she co-authored at the Stimson 
Center, examines central areas of concern as well as recommendations to solely improve U.S. 
drone policy and security. This is another example of recommendations made in the same 
standard as this paper. Davidson contends that the three areas of concern include ensuring 
innovation while retaining security, the counterproductive threat UAVs present to national 
sovereignty, and questions regarding the legality and ethics behind strikes. In the 
recommendations area Davidson suggests UAV control must be completely transferred from the 
CIA to the military with improved transparency, and that there should be comprehensive 
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strategic reviews of benefits and costs. Davidson adds, “UAVs should ultimately be neither 
glorified or demonized.”
148
 Davidson’s suggestion that UAV strikes move to complete DOD 
jurisdiction is also a conclusion that this paper comes to as well.  
 Jessica Schulberg writes on the eventual proliferation of UAV technology and what is an 
already waning monopoly the U.S. has on UAV technology. Her recommendations come at the 
UAV policy debate from a different angle compared to the Rand and Davidson papers, as she 
focuses on the business and proliferations aspects of UAVs. At the same time Schulberg, like the 
Rand paper, finds it important to set international norms, but through business channels as 
opposed to creating transparent policy. Schulberg finds that export laws on UAV technology 
suppress innovation, limit cooperation with allies, and reduce U.S. influence on the foreign 
development of UAVs.  With all these effects she concludes that these export controls may not 
only hurt U.S. business interests, but also national security interests.
149
 
 Both Andrew Callam’s work and the piece “Drones of War” take a historical approach by 
exploring the history of drones as well as their use in Pakistan. Andrew Callam provides a 
detailed history of UAVs. With regard to UAV strikes in Pakistan, he also provides evidence that 
the CIA program creates paranoia and distrust among terrorists, causing them to change their 
behavior by acting as a deterrent. Callam also details this paranoia leading to the execution of 
otherwise innocent civilians who are believed to be assisting the Americans. Callam does not 
address how this resulting change in behavior and threat toward civilians affects Pakistani 
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civilians and their view of UAVs or the United States.
150
 Like other research on this topic, 
Callam uses Pakistan as a case study, but in some ways falls short by not synthesizing a strong 
conclusion.  
 Like Callam, In “Drones of War,” looks specifically at Pakistan, but an interesting theory 
is offered among the classic observations made about the history and use of UAVs that are seen 
in much of the existing research. In this piece, the author suggests that an ulterior motive or 
intended tertiary effect caused by the negative civilian reaction to UAV use in Pakistan is to 
force the Pakistani government to engage more on their own in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) without the assistance or involvement of the United States.
151
 This theory 
would be hard to prove; nevertheless it is interesting and represents an original idea on 
motivations for UAV policy despite being somewhat far-fetched.  
 In addition to Callam and “Drones of War,” Roland Gomori delves into the many 
questions and issues regarding UAV strikes in Pakistan. Gomori questions the significance of 
many targets, the undermining of U.S. interests when civilians are killed as well as the push 
factor it create to join terrorist groups, the cost of resources for results attained, and the line the 
United States delineates between civilians and militants when measuring casualties.  All of these 
issues or factors are key in judging the accountability and success of U.S. UAV programs.
152
 
Gomori shares a commonality with this paper in questioning the achievements UAVs are making 
in Pakistan and if short-term goals are made to the detriment of long term objectives.  
 Micah Zenko provides analysis and recommendations on UAV reform. The 
recommendations are broken up into three categories: Executive Branch, U.S. Congress, and 
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International Cooperation. For the Executive branch, he recommends the White House should 
end “Signature Strikes,” limit killing to Al Qaeda leadership, examine UAV jurisdiction between 
the CIA and DOD, and become more transparent with the public regarding UAV policy. The 
U.S. Congress needs to demand regular briefings from the White House, and hold hearings on 
the long and short term-effects of UAV attacks. Regarding international cooperation, Zenko 
suggests the U.S. should develop an international code of conduct, create an association for UAV 
manufacturers to ensure standards and best practices, and promote international dialogues akin to 
those on cyber warfare and nuclear weapons.
153
 Zenko shares similarities with the Rand article in 
supporting transparency, Schulberg in using business channels to create norms, and like Gomori 
questions the efficacy and success of strikes in Pakistan, especially “Signature Strikes.” Zenko 
also informed this paper by examining transparency issues on both a domestic and international 
level.  
Section II: In Favor of UAV Use  
  David A. Bell, in his article for the New Republic, recognizes the critique that if war can 
be waged without any major risks, then a major restraint has been removed.  Bell counters by 
looking to the history of warfare and arguing that throughout history militaries have sought to get 
a technological advantage to kill the other side in the safest manner possible. At one time 
gunpowder was looked upon with “chivalric outrage.” In his summary Bell argues restraint in 
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 Rosa Brooks supports Bell’s argument that restraint should not depend on technology. 
She goes one step further and posits that UAV strikes are much more precise in their targeting, 
and they in fact kill far less civilians than other more traditional forms of warfare. She provides 
evidence that UAVs can spend up to months monitoring a target before striking, which creates 
greater discretion concerning targets. Regarding civilian deaths, Brooks uses statistical evidence 
to state that UAVs kill far less civilians than traditional combat. Concerning the lack of restraint 
with killing from afar or the accidental targeting of innocent civilians, Brooks theorizes that 
these are ethics, intelligence, and strategy issues- not UAV issues.
155
 
 Daniel Byman, writing for the Brookings Institute, makes the case for UAVs as the 
choice tool for U.S. war fighting. In general Byman argues that UAVs have destroyed Al Qaeda 
leadership in Pakistan and Yemen (countries he states secretly support UAV strikes) with little 
financial cost, threat to U.S. Personnel, and with few civilian casualties as compared to other 
methods. At the same time, Byman does argue for more transparent and straightforward rules 
regarding UAV strikes. Byman also argues that UAVs make it exceptionally hard for terrorists to 
communicate, train new recruits, and have any type of large-scale meeting or event in the open.  
Essentially, they make it incredibly difficult for terrorists to conduct many of the tasks they need 
to accomplish to be successful.  Byman also makes the case that UAVs violate a state’s 
sovereignty far less than soldiers actually being on the ground, and that leaving it up to allies in 
many of these regions can usually mean the torture and execution of detainees.  Byman also 
contends that the argument for drones creating more terrorists is that Pakistanis and Yemenis 
may dislike the use of UAVs, but it does not compare to their enmity towards their own 
government for the corruption, weak institutions, and poor economic growth that occurs under 
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their watch. While Byman defends UAV use, he also puts forth recommendations that include 
setting precedents for international norms and creating transparency to avoid myth creation by 
antagonistic actors and states. Transparency is especially important when it comes to “Signature 
Strikes” so as to dispel the idea that the U.S. is acting recklessly and targeting an inordinate 
amount of innocent civilians.
156
 Byman makes a great case for the disruption of terrorist 
activities, and like Brooks and Bell offers that UAVs create a level of restraint. He also provides 
strong case as to why UAVs are an important tool, but an important takeaway that this paper 
shares with Byman is the need for transparency and reform when it comes to “Signature Strikes.”  
 “Drones over Pakistan: Secrecy, Ethics, and Counterinsurgency,” shares the same 
ideology as all the other papers in this section regarding UAVs as compared to manned aircraft 
in the safety they bring to U.S. forces, as well as civilians due to the increased level of 
discrimination that is possible with UAVs.
157
 But like Byman the conclusion is that more 
transparency is needed to make UAVs a better tool in countering terrorism. This is a sentiment 
that this paper shares.   
Section III: Against UAV Use  
 
 The literature against UAV use can be broken into certain logical groupings based on 
why they oppose UAV strikes. In the first grouping is literature that argues from a legal 
perspective on the issue of UAV strikes.   
 The U.N. Special Rapporteur produced a report on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary 
executions, which found that while the use of UAVs is not technically illegal, they serve to make 
it easier for states to use lethal force in the territories of other sovereign states. This report 
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examines the way in which international, human rights, and humanitarian law should regulate the 
use of UAVs.
158
 This is another example of the case being made that UAVs allow for a lack of 
restraint when it comes to war fighting. This point is taken seriously in this paper and 
recommendations consist of improvements in transparency and engaging with the international 
community.  
 While the U.N. tiptoes on the legality question which in the realm of international law is 
unquestionably murky, Mary Ellen O’Connell finds that UAV strikes in Pakistan are illegal in 
her case study for Notre Dame Law School. O’Connell argues that launching missiles or bombs 
can only be performed in armed conflict, which O’Connell finds did not exist in Pakistan up until 
2009. Furthermore, she argues that the CIA, who operates weaponized UAVs in Pakistan, are not 
considered lawful combatants so their operation and use by this agency is criminal. Outside of 
legal arguments, she also finds that military force is not effective against terrorism and that the 
numbers of leaders killed compared to unintended victims rounds to roughly every 20 leaders 
killed, 750 to 1000 unintended victims are struck.
159
 O’Connell’s legal argument may be 
technically correct, but at the same time somewhat absurd in critiquing the legality of an agency 
that operates covertly. This paper finds that the better argument for removing the CIA from 
operational responsibilities is so that it can return to its main priority of collecting intelligence.  
 In the same vein as O’Connell and U.N. Special Rapporteur, the Deputy Editor for the 
Council on Foreign Relations Jonathan Masters makes a legal argument regarding UAVs. 
Masters takes a different approach though, and argues from the domestic or congressional 
purview. He references John B. Bellinger and the need to update the AUMF. This paper agrees 
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with this assertion and also makes recommendations to update the AUMF. Masters also cites 
multiple examples of critiques from experts that have said the current UAV attacks in Pakistan 
have done more damage than good to U.S.-Pakistan relations. Bellinger offers recommendations 
for how the UAV program can be more successful in Pakistan, including greater coordination 
with the State Department as well as Pakistani interlocutors.
160
 These are two recommendations 
this paper also makes.   
 In the next grouping Musa al-Gharbi and Malou Innocent both argue against UAV use 
based on evidence that they are ineffective and counterproductive. They also both use UAV 
strikes in Pakistan to make their respective cases. On a more macro level they also point to the 
strain that UAV strikes can cause between Pakistan and its people as well as between the United 
States and Pakistan.  
 Musa al-Gharbi argues that UAVs have been a complete failure in Pakistan and Yemen. 
He points to the assassination of Taliban chief Hakimullah Meshud, who was about to sign a 
cease-fire with Afghanistan. The strike was condemned by both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in 
the aftermath Al Qaeda vowed to strike at both the U.S. and Pakistan as an act of revenge for the 
assassination. Al-Gharbi also makes the case that UAVs destroy the little infrastructure there is 
in regional areas, therefore hurting local branches of government, allowing for the empowerment 
of non-state or terrorist organization actors.
161
  
  Malou Innocent provides one of the more critical pieces of literature on UAV policy. 
Innocent’s main point of contention is that in the simplest terms UAV strikes do more harm than 
good when it comes to countering terrorism. She namely looks at how UAVs serve to anger the 
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Pakistani public at both the U.S. and Pakistani governments, strain the relationship between both 




 Both al-Gharbi and Innocent make convincing cases for the turmoil and strain that UAVs 
cause: al-Gharbi points to the destruction of infrastructure and destabilizing effect on the region 
while Innocent looks to the push factors towards empathizing with and joining terrorist causes. 
This paper takes these points into strong consideration when making recommendations for UAV 
strikes, especially when it comes to “Signature Strikes.” 
 The last two entries in this literature review are intensive studies into the effects of UAV 
strikes on Pakistani civilians with very damning results with regard to the toll these strikes take 
on the populace in almost every conceivable way. The results from these studies make a strong 
case for both the lack of ethics of these strikes, but also for the destabilization of these areas, 
which can create an environment prime for terrorist organizations to flourish and recruit. These 
arguments mirror al-Gharbi and Innocent’s claims, but go in more detail and as such can provide 
specific examples as to how these strikes truly affect life inside Pakistan.  
 The Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and NYU Law 
School, through more than 130 extensive interviews with victims, witnesses, experts, and 
humanitarian and medical workers, collaborated on an article that found UAV use in Pakistan to 
be an ineffective tool for counterinsurgency, especially with regard to the impact on Pakistani 
civilians writ large.  The article contends that the U.S. narrative that presents the precision of 
UAV strikes with little collateral impact as false.
163
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 Columbia Law School and the Center for Civilians in Conflict provide a critical 
evaluation on the civilian toll that UAV strikes create in theaters outside of traditional war zones. 
The article focuses on JSOC and CIA covert strikes for the lack of transparency, accountability, 
and lack of legal implications. More importantly the research is groundbreaking in its 
comprehensive examination into the nature of the toll on civilians, including but not limited to 
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Section I: Strategic Analysis and Recommendations 
 
Updating the Authorization For Use Of Military Force 
 
  Both the Obama and Bush administrations have justified capture and kill missions of 
terrorists in any state based on the “Authorization For Use of Military Force Against 
Terrorists.
165
” The joint resolution was signed into Congress on September 14, 2001, just days 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Section 2(a) is where both Bush and Obama administrations have 
found a basis to support capture and kill missions. Section 2(a) reads:  
(a) IN GENERAL- That the President is authorized to use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such 
nations, organizations or persons.
166
 
This short paragraph is sweeping in its power and provides through its vagueness the 
ability for the President to target or kill any individual that he deems to be connected to terrorism 
in any way and anywhere. Section 2(a) served a very important purpose in allowing the United 
States to strike back and attack Al Qaeda directly and immediately after 9/11, but it is now over 
ten years later and the joint resolution should be updated to address the current situation when it 
comes to countering terrorism around the globe. Security expert John B. Bellinger supports the 
idea of an updating the AUMF, noting that it has been over ten years since it was enacted and 
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that many of the groups that are now being targeted under the auspices of the AUMF like ISIL, 
al-Shabaab and others are not directly connected to the 9/11 attacks.
167
 The following is a list of 
changes that should be considered in updating the AUMF with regard to the current situation and 
environment of war fighting:  
1. Language should not address perpetrators of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but 
instead acknowledge Al Qaeda and all organizations, governments, insurgent 
movements, and persons connected to terrorist movements or insurgencies 
that threaten U.S. and international interests.  
2. A clause should specifically address the asymmetry of the war on terrorist 
organizations and specify that there are no boundaries to where targeting can 
take place due to the statelessness nature of these organizations.   
3. A clause should address U.S. citizens that have become terrorists or would 
otherwise qualify as being targets. The clause will direct these cases to be 
referred to the newly created “Targeting Court.” 
4. If deemed necessary or requested, the Presidential administration should 
present evidence and documentation for individual targeting to pertinent 
Congressional committees for review after a strike has been performed. 
5. Acknowledgement that efforts will be made to create transparency and avoid 
civilian casualties when at all possible.   
6. Addition of a “sunset clause” that requires the AUMF to be voted on and 
possibly updated every five years to address changes in the war fighting 
environment regarding terrorist organizations.  
                                                        




 The AUMF in its vagueness and sweeping power allowed President Bush to kidnap and 
confine hundreds, and President Obama to target and kill with little to no oversight, including 
U.S. citizens without any judicial process like in the Anwar al-Awalki case.
168
 These updates to 
the AUMF would show that the government is willing to evolve and address the issues that arise 
in fighting against Al Qaeda and terrorist organizations around the world. 
 Change number one addresses the fact that it is more than ten years removed from the 
events of 9/11. While necessary to recognize the importance of the 9/11 attacks policymakers 
must also realize that only one senior member of Al Qaeda (Ayman al-Zawahiri) from that 
period remains an active combatant.
169
 Updating this language acknowledges that the United 
States has progressed from this point and that there are a multitude of terrorist organizations, and 
that some are not directly linked to AQ or the 9/11 attacks.  
 Change two suggests that the United States properly define that the war against terrorist 
organizations is boundless, and that the government clearly define and acknowledge in it’s 
legislation the willingness to hunt and target terrorists and collaborators anywhere in the world. 
This change shows an understanding of the asymmetrical and borderless nature of this war as 
well as provides transparency instead of secrecy about actions that will be found out by the 
population through the news and media regardless of attempts at keeping them covert.  
 Change three addresses the lack of judicial review, or transparent judicial review, when it 
comes to the targeting of a U.S. citizen that is abroad, not extraditable, and involved in terrorist 
activities. With the creation of a “Targeting Court” these U.S. citizens would be afforded a form 
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of judicial review before becoming official targets and create a proper precedent for creating 
transparency and norms.  
 Change four allows for Congressional oversight in the form of reviews of target cases. 
This will appease Congress, the public, and also help to ensure that the Executive branch is 
aware that Congress can keep track of their targeting practices and effectively create a checks 
and balances system for UAVs.  
 Change five deals with the issue of civilian casualties as a result of UAV strikes. While 
there is no way to ensure that innocent civilians are not killed during UAV strikes, due to the 
asymmetrical battlefield, it is important to avoid civilian casualties not only because it 
undermines overall counter-terrorism efforts, but because as a country the United States should 
strive to avoid human rights violations, and respect the sanctity of innocent human life as much 
as possible, including when engaged in warfare.  
 Change six would include a “sunset clause” that would make it necessary for the 
resolution to be reenacted and updated as policymakers see fit. This should help to prevent abuse 
of power, create more transparency as to the current status of the fight against terrorist 
organizations, as well as ensure that the United States adapts to the best policy and rule of law to 
fit the current environment. 
 These changes to the AUMF will help the U.S. adapt to the current iteration of counter-
terrorism strategy, but also show that as a country the Unites States is willing to provide more 
oversight in the form of Congressional review, judicial process through a targeting court, and 
limit the absolute power the President currently has to target individuals. Creating transparency 
through a more detailed and exact AUMF should put the public more at ease and provide 




human rights. Even dissenters or critics will be unable to contend that the government isn’t being 
open about the process and working to provide rights as much as operationally and tactically 
possible while fighting a war of such an asymmetrical nature. 
UAV Strikes as a part of the Larger U.S. Counter-Terrorism and Foreign Policy 
  
While UAV strikes are incredibly successful at killing terrorist targets, they need to be 
contextualized within the greater U.S counter-terrorism and foreign policy narrative. A good 
example of this disconnect is that while Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) strikes are 
coordinated with the Ambassador in country, CIA strikes are not. A public example of this 
disconnect is when then-Secretary of State Clinton told the Somali Contact group that she 
strongly believed air strikes would not be a good idea and that no one in the United States is 
considering such action, only to have a drone strike occur hours later in the area.
170
  
This lack of coordination seriously undermines the integrity of diplomatic efforts abroad. 
The major issue with UAV strikes is the gamble of short-term gains through the elimination of 
terrorist threats versus the long-term effects on CVE initiatives and bilateral relations- especially 
with countries that should be partners in countering violent extremism. A case with more serious 
repercussions due to a lack of coordination occurred when a UAV strike that killed Taliban chief 
Hakimulla Mehsud cancelled an imminent cease-fire between the Taliban and Afghanistan, 
prompting condemnation from both the Pakistani and Afghan governments of the United States 




 Before exploring this issue, it should also be mentioned that there is major contention as 
to whether UAV strikes are accurate in targeting terrorist organization leadership and individuals 
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who pose an imminent threat to the United States. Multiple studies have found that the majority 
of victims from these attacks are “low-level, anonymous, suspected militants” with no ties to 
international terror activities as opposed to fighting against their local government.
172
 
Furthermore, even if strikes are successful at hitting intended targets, there is a popular 
contention among experts that these attacks may serve to erode local and national sovereignty 
and be counterproductive to the intended goals of weakening terrorist organizations.
173
  
This question of whether the means are getting us to the desired end is imperative. In this 
context, even if one accepts that UAV strikes are successful in taking out terrorist leadership and 
imminent threats, the serious questions of whether in the long run are they damaging efforts to 
rid a region or state of violent extremism exists. The idea is that continued strikes in a region or 
area will serve to destabilize, radicalize, and make a local populace sympathize and possibly join 
militant organizations as, from their point of view, they are innocent bystanders being attacked 
from an omnipresent foreign country. This dynamic has been witnessed in Yemen as Micah 
Zenko has found that “there appears to be a strong correlation in Yemen between increased 
targeted killings since December 2009 and heightened anger toward the United States and 
sympathy with or allegiance to AQAP.”
174
  
In Pakistan a U.S. military official called drone operations “a recruiting windfall for the 
Pakistani Taliban.”
175
 Al-Jazeera found that 59 percent of Pakistanis believed the U.S. was a 
greater threat to the state than Al Qaeda largely due to UAV strikes.
176
 Andrew Callam uses a 
quote from Andrew Exum and David Kilcullen that aptly contextualizes this dynamic:  
                                                        
172 Mica Zenko, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” Council on Foreign Relations. 
173 Janine Davidson, “Drones: Three Misconceptions, Concerns, and Ways to Make Things Better- a Report from the Stimson 
Center Task Force,” Council on Foreign Relations. 
174 Mica Zenko, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” Council on Foreign Relations. 
175 Malou Innocent, “The US Must Reassess Its Drone Policy,” Cato Institute. 




“While violent extremists may be unpopular, for a frightened population they 
seem less ominous than a faceless enemy that wages war from afar and often kills 
more civilians than militants.” If the civilian deaths caused by drone attacks are 
indeed solidifying the popular support of Islamic militants, the drone program 
may prevent success in northwest Pakistan.
177
  
Exum and Kilcullen present this dilemma that occurs with UAV strikes, and Callam 
clarifies that this would ultimately make it difficult if not impossible for U.S. foreign policy to be 
successful.  
Creating civilian distrust and anger at the United States is one negative outcome of UAV 
strikes, but UAV strikes do not only harm soft power or diplomatic counterterrorism efforts. 
From a military and security perspective, poor or uncoordinated UAV strategy can cause strife 
between partner nations, as the case has been with Pakistan. Cooperation with regard to UAV 
strikes is complex and when the relationship creates discord host nations have been known to 
shut down intelligence sharing and cooperation in other CT initiatives in response to displeasure 
with UAV strikes.
178
 This disharmony is more common with CIA UAV strikes as there is no 
advanced warning or coordination between the United States and the host country. 
 This lack of coordination by the CIA is apparent even with other U.S. foreign policy 
stakeholders like the Department of State and USAID, as mentioned in the anecdote at the 
beginning of this section.
179
 Consequently, these strikes can serve to undermine CVE efforts by 
the Department of State and USAID as representatives have claimed that strikes “diminish the 
effectiveness of civilian assistance programs.”
180
 Former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron 
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Munter accurately sums up the dichotomy or conflict of interest, stating, “The problem is the 
political fallout…Do you want to win a few battles and lose the war?”
181
  
In 2011 the CIA made concessions that UAV targeting was harming overall relations 
with Pakistan, and made changes including giving the State Department more influence in 
targeting decisions and giving Pakistani leaders more forewarning to attacks.
182
 This is a step in 
the right direction, and more policy reforms that create intra-agency and state cooperation can 
help to minimize errors and uncoordinated strategy.    
 Even with strikes that are technically successful in hitting a known target with minimal to 
no civilian casualties, it must be understood that the simple act of launching theses strikes in 
itself can have a negative effect on how the local populace views the United States. This is true 
of the best-case scenario, and when civilians are killed and civilian structures are destroyed this 
effect is only multiplied. The destruction of the little infrastructure there is in many of these 
regions only serves to delegitimize regional governments, draw ire towards the United States, 
and empower insurgent movements in recruiting efforts.
183
  
  In an expansive and in-depth account by Stanford and NYU Law schools on the broad 
effects of UAV policy on Pakistani civilians, the findings show strikes cause property damage 
and economic hardship; mental health issues; damage to education and social and cultural life; 
and a disintegration of community trust.
184
   
 Property and local infrastructure is damaged in strikes, and many times surrounding 
houses of innocent civilians are included in the damage from a UAV strike. In addition to 
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property damage, innocent civilian deaths, because of profiling, are usually adult males that are 
the source of income for many extended families.
185
 
 Injuries to civilians are not restricted to the physical. There are mental effects as well, 
including a constant state of “anticipatory anxiety” and PTSD from UAV strikes. There is a 
feeling of constant helplessness and fear for when the next attack can take place. UAV strikes 
and the resulting fear have also had an effect on the education system in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Strikes have destroyed schools as well as routes to schools, 
and subsequently made families fear sending their kids to structures that have been targeted in 
the past. Children have also passed up education to take care of family members that have been 
injured by strikes. The mental issues caused by UAV strikes also serve to decrease attendance as 
kids simply cannot concentrate or focus in class due to an overwhelming fear of UAV strikes.
186
 
While cultural and social effects may not be as serious as educational, mental, and 
property issues, they are still important to address to gain perspective on the all-encompassing 
effect UAV strikes can have on the Pakistani people. Villagers are afraid to congregate and 
participate in routine events and gatherings including funerals, but the most significant disruption 
has been to the Jirga system.  Jirga is a process that serves as a conflict resolution system for 
villagers to solve problems. With the fear to congregate, especially in large numbers, the jirga 
process cannot accomplish this necessary task for a village to be able to work through local 
disputes and issues. In addition to the loss of the Jirga process for many villages, discord is 
increased by a rampant paranoia that certain villagers are working with the CIA to mark and 
inform them of targets for UAV strikes.
 187
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This section outlines the devastating unintended repercussions of UAV strikes. 
Additionally, Pakistan, the most notable country that has been host to U.S. UAV strikes, serves 
to show how UAV strikes strain bilateral relations, and undermine CVE and goodwill foreign 
policy initiatives writ large. Pakistan also provides examples where UAV strikes serve to create a 
local populace that is disgruntled and impaired in every effect from mental and physical health 
issues to infrastructure, economic, and even social or traditional elements.  
To move forward with UAV strikes there must be a serious consideration for how these 
strikes play into the larger CT, CVE, and foreign policy efforts by the United States. The 
operational military aspect of counter-terrorism efforts must make a concerted effort to better 
coordinate not only with the other departments and agencies that are looking to counter terrorist 
organizations, but also host nations that the United States depend on for intelligence.  
The recommendations to counter the negative consequences are threefold. Domestically, 
or on the interagency level, planning of these strikes must be done in consultation with the 
Department of State to create a more uniformed front and to avoid costly and embarrassing 
mistakes that undermine the credibility of U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, coordination needs 
to increase between UAV strikes and CVE and counterterrorism efforts on the ground, as these 
programs are the initiatives that look to solve the systemic issues that create an environment that 
both incubates potential recruits for terrorist organizations and allows these organizations to 
flourish and survive. Without this coordination it is quite possible, and likely, that UAV strikes 
will only serve to further create long-term instability and situations that will make the fight 
against these groups even more difficult.  
Bilaterally, the United States must increase coordination and engagement with host 




strikes to be successful and to avoid discontent that will lead to greater difficulty for the United 
States to engage in greater foreign policy objectives.  
Perhaps the most important recommendation is tactical in nature. “Living Under Drones: 
Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan” and “The Civilian 
Impact of Drone Strikes: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions” both extensively show not 
only the wide-ranging damage UAV strikes cause in Pakistan, but how these damages can create 
sentiment of anger towards the United States and actively push Pakistani civilians to empathize 
and even join terrorist organizations. Based on these studies, it is clear that collateral damage to 
innocent civilians must be limited as much as possible and the bar for when a UAV strike can be 
employed must seriously consider the destructive and long-term effects compared with the 
possible killing of a target. It is important to reiterate Former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan 
Cameron Munter’s statement, “Do you want to win a few battles and lose the war?”
188
      
Creating Transparency, Oversight, and International Norms  
 
 It is difficult to speak of transparency when discussing something like UAV strikes, 
which are supposed to be covert in nature. This has changed to some degree with the Obama 
administration’s acknowledgement that UAVs were being used outside the classic battlefield 
despite this kind of operation’s covert nature. The issue here is that calling something covert 
when it is clearly overt and the entire international community is aware of it only serves to create 
doubts about the morality, legality, and overall process. Covert actions are covert for a reason- 
the government perpetrating these operations would rather not be linked to them for a multitude 
of reasons. While the proverbial imagination or fear is most likely worse than the reality, this 
murky opaque acknowledgement- a step in the right direction- in the short term creates more 
                                                        





questions and concerns than a truly covert or overt operation. Abizaid and Brooks address the 
situation concisely stating, “The United States’ drone policies damage its credibility, undermine 
the rule of law and create a potentially destabilizing international precedent — one that 
repressive regimes around the globe will undoubtedly exploit.”
189
 To combat this narrative the 
United States must engage in creating transparency with the right actors, ensure proper oversight, 
and engage with the international community to create process norms and ensure cooperation 
and understanding.   
 Domestic oversight and transparency in many ways means Congressional oversight. This 
should be handled by closed-door committee hearings on non-battlefield targeted killing so that 
elected representatives have a chance to inquire and learn about the process therefore allowing 
them to assuage the public’s concerns without also providing information that may compromise 
capability. Committee hearings, reports and general oversight can occur, or information can be 




The Senate Committee on Intelligence chair Diane Feinstein states that the CIA briefs the 
committee with “monthly in-depth oversight meetings to review strikes records and allow the 
committee to question every aspect of the program.”
191
 There are two issues at play here. First, 
with UAV strikes most likely moving into DOD jurisdiction, the Intelligence Committee may not 
have as much oversight, so if/when the process switches over, oversight should transfer or be 
shared with the Armed Services Committee as well. Second, just like there is poor coordination 
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among the interagency when countering terrorism on the ground, there is no oversight by the 
Foreign Affairs committee and similar other committees that have interests that may be directly 
affected by UAV strikes. Allowing these committees oversight would help ensure a 
comprehensive understanding from all engaged government parties. To evolve, additional 
committees that are involved in countering terrorist organizations should have the opportunity to 
question and gain understanding of UAV strikes to better increase coordination, and have 
additional oversight, and thus a larger overall counter-terrorism perspective or review.   
Additional committee oversight and the enacting of committee hearings should provide 
ample domestic oversight, and transparency. Regarding domestic transparency it must be 
recognized that UAV strikes are still intelligence/military tactical operations, so the amount of 
transparency and information shared with the general public must be closely regarded. At the 
same time, representatives that make up oversight committees on this issue must not politicize 
the facts and accurately assuage fears about the UAV process to their constituency.  
 In addition to Congressional oversight to create more transparency through hearings and 
testimony, there is an additional and possibly even more important way to create review. The 
United States should make the utmost effort to open investigations into UAV strikes to assure 
and address both the domestic and international public concern over these strikes. Columbia Law 
School and The Center for Civilians in Conflict compile the wide-ranging positive effects of 
transparent investigations:  
Investigations, particularly where they are conducted with a degree of 
transparency, send a meaningful signal to foreign publics that the US is 
committed to human dignity and human life. They would offer the US 




civilian objects, such as mosques and schools—allegations that gravely 




These investigations, along with committee oversight, should be implemented not only to show 
transparency and oversight, but because it would allow the United States to actively engage and 
separate fact from fiction both domestically and internationally.   
 In addition to oversight and transparency, working to create international norms is 
crucial. UAVs will only become more prevalent as time goes on and it is imperative that other 
nations and actors use UAV technology responsibly.  Because the United States is at the 
forefront of UAV technology and weaponized use, it has the unique potential to alone set these 
international norms.  
 So far the United States has been poor in this area and not engaged properly, or to the 
degree that would help to set these norms. Other nations are beginning UAV programs and if the 
United States does not take the opportunity they have now to set these norms, the United States 
might find itself or its interests the victim of foreign states or actors using UAVs. The U.S. 
monopoly on drone technology is, for all intents and purposes ending, and this realization is 
important as an impetus to create the sentiment of urgency for creating norms.
193
The course for 
the United States to create these norms can be accomplished in three distinct ways: reforming 
export laws, creating transparency, and engaging with the United Nations.   
 Stringent export laws have been enacted to reduce the proliferation of UAV technology, 
but in effect it has created unintended negative consequences. Jessica Schulberg lays out these 
consequences, declaring: “Poorly conceived export laws will have the effect of suppressing 
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useful innovation, limiting interoperability with allies, reducing US influence over foreign UAV 
development and weakening the defense industrial base.”
194
 In this area the U.S. should 
cautiously remove export laws that are doing more to damage U.S. influence over UAV 
technology than it is to control unwanted proliferation. Not only will this help American business 
interests and innovation, but also if countries are using American-made UAVs, there is a much 
better opportunity to influence and manage how the UAVs are being used.  
 Domestic reforms have already been suggested in this section, and while the transparency 
and oversight recommendations are a good start, for international partners the process needs to 
build upon those recommendations when working to create transparency. The U.S. must provide 
leadership on UAV policy through example and bilateral engagement with partners to develop 
guidelines and an evolving dialogue for UAV use.
195
  
 With regard to the U.N. the United States proposes that they have legal authority to use 
UAV strikes and are not violating the sovereignty rights of countries where these strikes occur 
under the auspices of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which states:  
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
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Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
196
 
This may cover the United States legally, but does little-to-nothing for creating UAV norms as 
no country that is part of the UN has officially condoned UAV strikes regarding human rights 
issues.
197
 If the United States continues to keep policy shrouded in secrecy despite the reality of 
the overt nature of these operations, the international community, especially antagonistic states 
and actors, will work to create myths and exaggerated horrors as to how UAVs are operating.
198
   
Where there has been conflict or issue is with the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, as well as the Special Rapporteur on Human 
Rights and Countering Terrorism. These offices are where the United States has to engage to 
create credibility and then norms for UAV operations.  
Currently the U.S. position is that military action against Al Qaeda does not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions Office.
199
 This 
position needs to be reversed and the United States needs to engage by answering or working to 
coordinate with the office by sharing as much information as possible on the requests that have 
been made. These requests include applicable internal laws, sovereign state consent, and the 
safeguards that are put in place.
200
 Engaging on these questions is imperative, and it is 
information the United States should be able to provide to help set the record straight and create 
norms in the international world.  
The Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Countering Terrorism has freely admitted 
that UAVs are not illegal weapons, but shows concern for the ease at which deadly force can be 
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deployed without enough consideration for the protection of innocent lives.
201
 The United States 
can assuage concerns by engaging in a dialogue and provide transparency and oversight where 
possible. With a show of engagement and cooperation with these two offices the impetus for 
setting international norms will begin. 
One specific area where the United States can begin to create international norms through 
transparency is by addressing the thorny issue of what constitutes the difference between a 
combatant and non-combatant. With only obscure definitions and unofficial records of death 
rates, the case for the supposed accuracy and “discrimination in the application of force” when it 
comes to UAVs is hotly contested.
202
 Christian Enemark details the way this lack of transparency 
severely hurts the United States prospects of creating international norms:  
The very persistence of doubt on these points undermines US strategic objectives 
in Pakistan, as well as international norms governing the use of force and the 
reputation of the United States as a champion thereof. For so long as the US 
government eschews transparency, it is in a weak position to argue for humane 
restraint in the use of drones by other states.
203
 
Like investigations into UAV strikes, being more clear regarding what the United States clarifies 
as a combatant or not will have a two-fold effect. First, it will provide effective transparency on 
an international level, and secondly, it will allow the United States to actively engage from a 
stronger position regarding human rights, and setting international UAV norms.   
 Creating transparency, oversight, and international norms are all critical factors in 
making U.S. UAV policy a better counter terrorism tool. This section finds that to be successful 
in these facets of UAV policy the U.S. must follow the subsequent recommendations: create 
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more comprehensive Congressional oversight; engage in investigations of UAV strikes; create 
clear definitions on combatants and war processes to create transparency and address or clarify 
fact from fiction; engage with the UN Special Rapporteur offices to create international norms 
and allow the United States to argue from a position of strength and not perceived hypocrisy; and 
create less stringent UAV export legislation to help continue U.S. influence over UAV 
technology. With these recommendations in place, the United States will greatly advance their 




Section II: Operational Analysis and Recommendations  
 
Creation of a UAV Fusion Center and the move of all UAV strike operations to Department of 
Defense Jurisdiction 
 
 This recommendation comes in two parts. Fortunately, the first part looks like it will 
occur shortly. The Obama administration seems poised to move the CIA or covert UAV strike 
program over to the DOD for complete jurisdictional control.
204
 This would be a sign of good 
adaption, as experts at the Stimson Center in their report on UAVs found the joint CIA and DOD 
UAV programs to be “duplicative and inefficient” and very much at risk for increased errors and 
complications for oversight.
205
 This shift seems even more likely based on the fact that the 
architect and apparent mastermind behind the CIA covert drone program and disposition matrix, 




 Another controversial issue is the question of the legality of UAV strikes. Critics argue 
that bombs or missiles are only allowed in lawfully armed conflict- of which is rarely if ever the 
case where UAVs are striking- and that members of the CIA are not lawful combatants.
207
 This 
point may not be as clear-cut though, as even one of the largest critics of UAV strikes, U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Countering Terrorism has stated that the strikes are not 
illegal by international law.
208
 The issue is that while technically covert, in reality UAVs are 
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overt, and therefore it makes even more sense that they should be moved from the CIA to the 
DOD.  
 This move is additionally important, as it would move UAV strikes that fall under Title-
50 to Title-10 or from intelligence legislative protection to military legislative protection. It is 
vital to note that military intelligence operations can still fall under Title-50 so these codes are 
not completely separate or distinct when it comes to military action.
209
 The most recent and 
notable example would be Navy Seals operating under CIA command in the raid that killed 
Osama Bin Laden. Nonetheless, the move to Title-10 is essential because it shows an interest in 
allowing for more review, as oversight would transfer from Senate and House intelligence 
committees to armed forces committees where there are fewer barriers to information sharing 
between the DOD and Congress. Because of this there is at least hope that the DOD will be more 
forthcoming when it comes to congressional oversight with UAV programs.
210
  
 This move makes sense from an oversight and institutional standpoint, but also in 
allowing the CIA to do what it does best, which is collect and analyze intelligence. The CIA is 
first and foremost an intelligence agency and therefore the majority of resources, manpower, and 
effort should be spent on intelligence collection and analysis. “Sheep-Dipping” military 
personnel to help run an in-house operation does not make sense. The DOD should be 
responsible for the actual deployment of ordinance and tactical operations so that CIA can be un-
tethered from the legal, press, oversight, and other complex issues that arise from being 
connected to UAV strikes.  Again it is important to point out that newly appointed CIA Director 
John Brennan sees the transition of the CIA UAV program to a DOD operation in much the same 
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light. Senior administration and CIA officials state that Brennan wants to bring the CIA back to 
its roots of being the best HUMINT collection agency there is. 
  Brennan has showed concern for the lack of oversight in general, but also for specifically 
dealing with the targeting of rogue American citizens.
211
 While the case and evidence against 
Anwar al-Awlaki, the first American citizen to be killed by a UAV, is convincing, it is an 
alarming prospect that formal due process was supposedly granted, albeit behind closed doors 
and within only the Executive branch of the government.
212
 Brennan has also raised concerns 
that collateral damage and ethical debates are possibly serving to hurt CIA mission more than the 
presumed successes of strikes.
213
 Again one should acknowledge that this is coming form John 
Brennan, who is not only considered the mastermind and architect of covert drone strikes run 
through the CIA, but is now the Director of the CIA and still a proponent of giving up 
jurisdiction to the DOD.  
 The second policy recommendation is to create a UAV fusion center under DOD 
jurisdiction. A fusion center would serve to coordinate and unify the UAV effort around the 
world. Despite being a DOD operation, strikes in non-war theaters like Pakistan, Yemen, and 
Somalia could still take place with the updated AUMF endorsed in the first policy 
recommendation of this paper. A central and unified command center would serve as a 
cornerstone to allow for the maximizing of “jointness” and intelligence sharing between both 
civilian and military intelligence agencies. Within the fusion center departments should be 
created based on region and terrorist organizations operating within those regions. These 
departments should be made up of liaison officers and analysts from the following agencies: 
CIA, NCTC, DIA, NGA, NRO, AFISRA, INSCOM, MCIA, ONI, FBI, and INR. The goal of 
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these departments should be to track and build cases for targets to be presented for placement on 
the capture or kill list. The fusion center should serve to enhance coordination, centralization, 
and increase the efficiency or speed at which intelligence can be shared and produced to help 
create applications for said list.  
 This two-part recommendation serves to help revamp the UAV strike process in 
providing functionality, transparency, and oversight. By removing the UAV program from the 
CIA, it allows that agency to get back to its main mission, which is intelligence collection and 
analysis. The move also allows for a singular department (DOD) to unify and centralize UAV 
strikes while still being able to operate under Title-10 or Title-50 provisions, although the 
majority of operations should fall under the Title-10 provision, which allows for more oversight 
whenever possible.  
 The creation of the UAV fusion center will create a more focused and coordinated effort 
under DOD jurisdiction. The center will also compress and remove bureaucratic steps from the 
targeting process by combining and coordinating agency efforts at the working level within the 
fusion center. This agency coordination within the center should remove gaps and redundancies 
in the intelligence community as well as expedite the process of getting a suspect onto a target 
list. The fusion center will ensure that despite DOD jurisdiction, civilian intelligence agencies 
will play an integral role.  
Creating a Targeting Court based off of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court  
 
 One of the more unfortunate and difficult aspects of the modern war against terrorism is 
that it can involve American citizens that join or become radicalized by Al Qaeda. One example 




Peshawar Pakistan before attempting to set off a bomb in Times Square.
214
 American citizen, 
Najibulla Zazi tried to blow up the NYC subway system.
215
 More recently, there is mounting 
evidence that Boston Marathon bombing suspects Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev were 
radicalized during a trip to Chechnya that the brothers had taken in 2012.
216
 What they have in 
common is that they were committing these terrorist attacks as citizens and on U.S. soil, were 
detainable, and as such they are going through the criminal justice system. The combination of 
being citizens and their actions taking place within American jurisdiction creates this possibility.  
 A gray area has arisen when an American citizen is participating or aiding terrorist 
activities abroad or in a war zone. The issue at play becomes a question of what rights an 
American citizen should be afforded despite operating as a hostile enemy combatant outside of 
American criminal jurisdiction. The first and most famous case where this has been an issue is 
the CIA UAV strike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki was an American Cleric from New 
Mexico who joined Al Qaeda, and eventually became “the leader of external operation for Al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” according to President Obama.
217
 The strike that killed al-
Awlaki was unprecedented in that it was the first time an American citizen had been added to the 
CIA capture or kill list and then killed by a covert UAV strike. This created a firestorm from 
civil liberties groups claiming that the due process of law had been excised in favor of an 
assassination only secretly justified behind closed doors.
218
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 The al-Awlaki case brings to light that due process of law was granted only by 
administration claims with no real corroboration.
219
 At the same time it would be near impossible 
in this case to arrest and try al-Awlaki as he was entrenched with Al Qaeda, making extradition 
impossible. The Obama administration made the case for the addition of al-Awlaki to the capture 
or kill list based on three factors:  
First, he posed an imminent threat to the lives of Americans, having participated 
in plots to blow up a Detroit-bound airliner in 2009 and to bomb two cargo planes 
last year. Second, he was fighting alongside the enemy in the armed conflict with 




While these aspects are all factual, credible and give more than enough reason for al-Awlaki to 
be added to the list, as a citizen he is still guaranteed his rights. This is where a “Targeting 
Court” would become a valuable tool in allowing the U.S. to target dangerous terrorist actors that 
are also U.S. citizens like al-Awlaki while still affording them their due process.  
 The court would be set up much in the same way that the United States Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) is. Like FISC, this “Targeting Court” would be a federal 
court where proceedings would be closed and records would be classified or redacted when made 
public. After a UAV Fusion Center creates a case for an American Citizen operating abroad to be 
added to the capture and kill list, a government lawyer with proper clearance can then present the 
case to at least one or more from a group of eleven federal judges that mirror the composition 
rules of FISC. This mirror configuration would mean judges are appointed by the Chief Justice 
of the United States, can only serve one, seven year (max) term, and at least three judges must 
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reside within 20 miles of D.C.
221
 One judge will always be on call due to the immediacy or 
possible time constraints in certain situations.    
 The court would serve to protect the due process of American citizens that are engaged in 
terrorist activities before the President puts them on a targeting list. The legal question brought 
up to the “Targeting Court” would be whether or not the actions of a suspect warrant the 
forfeiture or rescinding of their American citizenship. The legal basis for court decisions would 
be determined by Section 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1481) with some 
proposed amendments to address the statelessness of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. 
The following acts from the Immigration and Nationality Act would be the most relevant to the 
court with suggested changes in italics: 
 Taking an oath, affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a 
foreign state, hostile organization to the United States, or its political 
subdivisions after the age of 18 (Sec. 349 (a) (2) INA) 
 Entering or serving in the armed forces of a foreign state, or hostile 
organization engaged in hostilities against the U.S. or serving as a 
commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the armed forces of a foreign 
state or organization (Sec. 349 (a) (3) INA) 
 Conviction for an act of treason (Sec. 349 (a) (7) INA)222 
If the court found that the government had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect 
had committed one of these acts, they could rule to rescind the citizenship of the suspect and the 
suspect could then be presented to the President for the final authorization to be added to a 
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targeting list. In this capacity the court would offer these individuals as much judicial process as 
possible with regard to the context of the situation. This court would bring this complex situation 
in line with U.S. standards regarding the protection of citizens rights and a credible process that 




Section III: Tactical Analysis and Recommendations  
Terminate or Evolve “Signature Strikes” 
 
Arguments for and against UAV strikes usually center on the issue of unwarranted 
civilian deaths. Both proponents and critics will cite statistics to make their case. Advocates of 
UAV strikes claim the number of civilians killed by UAVs is minuscule in comparison to a full-
scale invasion. Rosa Brooks puts the average in Pakistan at each strike killing between .8 and 2.5 
civilians in comparison to 10 civilians killed for every combatant death during traditional armed 
conflicts.
223
  The New American Foundation estimates that since the Obama administration has 
taken over, UAVs have killed an estimated 3,300 Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other terrorist actors in 
Pakistan and Yemen, including 50 senior leaders.
224
 At the same time, critics will cite statistics 
that say only 20 terrorist leaders have been killed for every 750 to 1000 unintended victims.
225
  
What is clear is that the numbers range significantly based on the study, and that in total 
these numbers should always be taken skeptically no matter which perspective is supplying the 
statistics. Musa al-Gharbi posits that these statistics are not as important in evaluating the 
program as examining if the strikes are accomplishing the goals of weakening and destroying 
terrorist organizations.
226
 While al-Gharbi makes a good point, there still needs to be serious 
accountability and consideration when it comes to the unintended deaths of civilians, even if 
those statistics are less than that of other war fighting methods. With this in mind, the U.S. must 
take a serious look at the “Signature Strike” program.  
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The issue of “Signature Strikes” is in effect an extension of UAV strikes as a part of 
larger CT and American foreign policy, but from the tactical perspective. Earlier sections in this 
chapter examined the damage and strife that UAV strikes cause to civilians and villages in 
Pakistan, but this section is a specific critique of the “Signature Strike” process. Before getting 
into the arguments for and against and recommendations for the program, it is important to note 
that with regard to International Human Rights Law and specifically the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, which the United States ratified, the practice of “Signature Strikes” 
appear to violate specific sections. This includes the right to peacefully assemble, freedom of 




 “Signature Strikes,” also known as TADS (terrorist-attack-disruption strikes) or “crowd 
kills,” are UAV attacks where the targets are not actually a known actor or on a specific list for 
targeting, but are simply exhibiting what is termed “signature” behavior of a terrorist.
228
 The 
major issue or critique is that these signature behaviors are incredibly dubious as proof that a 
person or group is actually a terrorist or terrorist group. In Yemen this is especially the case as it 
is the most armed nation in the world with roughly 80 millions weapons for a population of 20 
million people equating to roughly four weapons for every man, woman, and child. A Yemeni 
official explained that it is quite normal for a civilian- not a militant- to be walking around with 
weapons, and added that it would be quite difficult to distinguish between the two.
229
 A senior 
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Department of State official made the morbid joke that to the CIA, three guys doing jumping 
jacks could represent a terrorist training camp.
230
  
An example of this kind of miscalculation came on March 17, 2011. On this date a 
“Signature Strike” was carried out on what was thought to be a heavily armed al-Qaeda group. 
The United States claimed to have killed 20 militants, but in reality the strike hit a “Jirga,” or 
local meeting to resolve village disputes, and killed 38 civilians and tribal police. Four Taliban 
fighters were killed, but they were simply there because the Taliban controls the area in which 
the village was located and they had to approve of all village decisions.
231
 These kinds of 
mistakes seriously bring into question the efficacy and principals of the “Signature Strikes” 
process when such egregious errors can be made.  
The Bush administration initially approved this type of attack in Pakistan, but the Obama 
administration has also applied the law in Yemen making all military-age males in a specific 
zone possible combatants. Despite statements that the rules for Yemen are much more rigorous, 
they are also not know to the public.
232
 Even proponents of UAV strikes have admitted that 
government needs to be more transparent and open about the rules and procedures regarding 
“Signature Strikes” as they risk tarnishing the larger UAV program in whole and create the 
image of a reckless White House.
233
 Perhaps even more concerning is that these UAV strikes 
have included children, people attempting to rescue drone strike victims, and funeral processions 
for militants.
234
 This act of striking at rescuers looking to assist victims of drone attacks is known 
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as the “Double Tap” and a UN special rapporteur has even gone so far as to suggest that the 
“double tap” practice could constitute a war crime.
235
  
 The “Double Tap” has had supposed success in Pakistan against Al Qaeda, but at the 
same time the stakes must be measured. These strikes create a narrative where the United States 
is willing to skirt international human rights laws and kill actors that might not be terrorists at all, 
but women, children, and people simply acting as first responders. This is an unacceptable policy 
that does more harm than good when thinking about the broader context of the war against 
terrorist organizations.  
 Going forward with recommendations for “Signature Strikes,” they must either be 
eradicated from U.S. counter-terrorism policy or go through a major evolution. This evolution 
must remove “double tap” tactics unless responders meet the criteria as the original target did, as 
well as make a serious effort to limit civilian casualties unless there is imminent danger posed by 
a target. Additionally, the traits or characteristics that represent a signature strike must show guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt in identifying that individuals are truly up to terrorist activities that 
threaten the United States or international community. Striking at local militants without solid 
and credible intelligence or evidence that they are more than simply local thugs carries too high a 
risk for collateral damage, as shown in the disastrous results of the March 17, 2011 strike.  
 The bar should be as high as to say that there should be absolutely no reasonable doubt 
that the actors and actions are those of a terrorist. Sarah Harvard describes this parameter, 
stating, “Targeted killing should be limited to the leadership of al-Qaeda, affiliated forces, or 
individuals with a direct role in operations in past or on-going terrorist plots against the United 
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 The only changes to this definition is to not only account for al-Qaeda, but for any 
insurgency group that poses a threat the United States, and to allow for the United States to strike 
to protect an ally from an imminent threat as well.  
 A “Signature Strike” is clearly suspect to a large number of credible critiques: is the 
target a militant or civilian that may just carry weapons as per cultural norms? If the target is a 
militant, do they pose a real and credible threat to the host nation or the United States? Will a 
strike cause civilian deaths? Is this a meeting of civilians simply being presided over by militants 
or a true meeting of terrorists? With a dearth of collaborative intelligence from host nations it is 
hard to answer these questions with great certainty. Therefore, the bar for “Signature Strikes” 
needs to be as high as possible before going forward.  
 Without serious changes that include a much higher bar of certainty about targets as well 
as a more serious regard to civilian life, there is no way that UAV strikes in the form of 
“Signature Strikes” or “Double Taps” can continue and not be of a great detriment to the large-
scale counter-terrorism and foreign relations goals of the United States.
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Section IV: Conclusion 
 
 As President Obama stated in his speech at West Point, the major national security threat 
both at home and abroad is from terrorist organizations. In the war against Al Qaeda, its regional 
offshoots, and similar organizations, the United States has evolved and progressed in war 
fighting to better combat the asymmetric nature of engaging this new enemy. With incredible 
innovation and lethality, the UAV program has brought new responsibilities, legal issues and 
moral questions that need to be addressed. In this new era the United States must tread carefully 
and be willing to realize how to equate long-term goals with short-term successes. In the 
scholarly world, and this paper, there is no shortage of proponents and critics of UAV 
technology. In some cases they will use the same evidence to make contradictory points. Where 
one side finds the number of civilian deaths a reason to stop the program the other will point to 
the limited amount compared to more traditional war fighting. Where one side sees the 
destruction of infrastructure, worsening bilateral relations, and the push factors that make 
recruiting for terrorist organizations easier, the other side sees Al Qaeda leadership decimated, 
and the difficulty for terrorist organizations to train, communicate, organize, and survive.  
 It is with this conflicting information and the reality of the situation that Janine Davidson 
and her panel at the Stimson Center conclude, in what is the most apt, albeit simple, 
summarization of UAVs, “UAVs should ultimately be neither glorified or demonized.”
237
 There 
are a lot of credible and valid critiques of UAVs, and there is a lot of evidence that supports their 
use at the same time. The superseding truth is that UAV technology will almost certainly 
continue to a play a large, and likely growing, role in fighting terrorist groups around the globe 
due to the lack of risk to U.S. soldiers as well as the immediate results it can attain. With this 
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understood truth, going forward UAV operations must be seamlessly integrated into the larger 
counter-terrorism strategy. This means not only inter-agency coordination and government 
oversight, but also coordination with the international community to create proper norms.  
 With this understanding in mind, this paper makes the following recommendations based 
on an analysis of strategic, operations, and tactical elements of the U.S. UAV program: 
Strategic 
 Update the AUMF to apply to the asymmetric nature of fighting terrorist 
organizations and multitude of groups that are not necessarily directly connected 
to the 9/11 attacks.    
 
 On the interagency level, planning of strikes must be done in consultation with the 
Department of State to create a more uniformed front and to avoid costly and 
embarrassing mistakes that undermine the credibility of U.S. foreign policy. 
 
 Coordination needs to increase between UAV and CVE/CT efforts on the ground 
as these programs are the initiatives that look to solve the systemic issues that 
create an environment that incubates potential recruits and allows terrorist 
organizations to flourish and survive.  
 
 Create greater transparency, oversight and norms both domestically and 




 DOD must take over all operational aspects of UAV programs to create better 
oversight and coordination as well as allow the CIA to get back to its mission of 
intelligence collection. 
 
 An UAV fusion center should be created to better coordinate the intelligence 
community and DOD with a more efficient process. 
 
 Establish a targeting court that grants due process to American citizens that 
cannot be detained or extradited for proper jurisprudence. 
 
Tactical  
 End or seriously adapt “Signature Strikes” to limit collateral damage to innocent 
civilians by seriously raising the bar for when a UAV strike can be employed with 
consideration for the destructive and long term effects compared with the possible 




 If these recommendations are met, the United States will prove it is serious about making 
UAVs successful not only unto itself, but as part of large-scale counter-terrorism initiatives, U.S. 










 On January 16, 2013, the In-Amenas gas plant in Algeria is taken over by Islamic 
militants.  Over 800 people are taken hostage by Abdul al Nigeri, one of Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s 
senior lieutenants.
238
 Over the course of a four-day standoff that ended with a siege by Algerian 
Special Forces, at least 37 foreigners were killed along with 29 militants.
239
 It is one of the 
deadliest terrorist attacks in recent history. November 2, 2013, Chislaine Dupont and Claude 
Verlone, French journalists in Northern Mali, are abducted and their bodies are discovered later 
that same day.
240
 On September 21, 2013, Islamist militants besiege the Westgate shopping mall 
in Nairobi Kenya. The attacks last four days and end with the death of 61 civilians, four Kenyan 
soldiers, and four attackers.
241
 
 While all of these events are horrific in their own right, they are unfortunately 
commonplace in Africa and especially in the Sahel region. Not only are they routine, but they are 
also significant in that they are indicative of an adaptation or evolution of terrorist tactics in 
Africa and specifically the Sahel region. This evolution is especially concerning because it 
suggests that the links to the overarching Al Qaeda brand or AQ central are more than just lip 
service. Africa has been home to discord, revolution, instability, and insurgency since colonial 
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powers returned power to local hands, but now there is a new threat that crosses borders, local 
issues, and insurgencies. This threat is the unifying ideology of Al Qaeda to attack and destroy 
any actor, state, or entity that is not in favor of Sharia law and the placement of an omnipresent 
ruling caliphate.  
 While this ideology has been Al Qaeda’s mission statement since their formation, there 
has been a change or evolution in management strategy. Since U.S. military campaigns have 
killed and captured much of Al Qaeda’s leadership, they have adapted to a more “Glocal” 
strategy.
 242
 This strategy keeps a small leadership core, but then lends its brand name out to local 
insurgencies across the globe and serves to connect them with their international network that 
can increase funding and resources for these groups. Now, multiple local insurgencies are not 
only starting to connect through training and sharing of resources, but their insurgent goals are 
expanding to encompass entire regions and even further.  
 This new movement of local insurgencies taking on international initiatives and goals 
working under the Al Qaeda flag is the impetus for this paper, which seeks to analyze the threat 
of one of these insurgent groups: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The question this 
paper seeks to answer is to what extent AQIM is a threat.    
 AQIM started out as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat with the sole purpose 
of overthrowing the Algerian government. In their current iteration as AQIM, they are now 
looking to take a larger stake in operations that help support the Al Qaeda mission. This paper 
will analyze the threat AQIM poses to the Sahel region and Europe, as well as globalization 
efforts and Western interests in the Sahel region.  This research is divided into two distinct 
sections. The first section will look to define all relevant terms including AQIM, Western 
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interests, threats, and the idea of globalization. The second section will contextualize and analyze 
the threat in the framework of the defined terms from section one.  This analysis will conclude 
that AQIM is a threat to varying degrees in all of the defined terms, but that the seriousness of 
the threat will be the most dire when it comes to the stability of the Sahel region, Western 
interests in that region and the ability for globalization to help to modernize and develop 
countries in that region. 
Section I: Defining Terms 
 
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
 When looking to define AQIM it is critical to understand the roots of the organization, 
which were planted in Algeria as the state gained independence from France in 1962. There are 
three distinct phases of evolution from the past to the present situation that have helped to shape 
AQIM in its current iteration.  These three phases are Pre-AQIM, AQIM or connecting with Al 
Qaeda, and post Al Qaeda splintering.  
 The Pre-AQIM phase was born out of the inner turmoil in Algeria as Islamists attempted 
to overthrow the new post-French secular government. After a military junta in 1992 was 
achieved to stop the Islamic political party (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front) from gaining control of 
the government, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was formed as an overarching conglomerate of 
Islamist militant groups to fight the Algerian military post-junta for control of the state.
243
 The 
GIA was at odds with the FIS in addition to the Algerian government, and took the reins of the 
Islamist movement by calling for a jihad to create an Islamist state. At this point the GIA not 
only attacked military installations, but also non-military targets including people that were a 
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threat to the jihad cause (journalists, intellectuals, and foreigners).
244
 In response to the GIA’s 
grab for power the FIS created a military arm called the AIS, which then lead to a civil war in 
Algeria between government forces, the GIA, and AIS. In 1997 the civil war saw over 40 
different massacres of civilians that are mostly attributed to the GIA.
245
  
 The GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) was created by former GIA leader 
Hassan Hattab, who had become disenfranchised with GIA tactics against civilian targets and 
realized that the group would be unable to get international jihadist support if they continued to 
target civilians and innocent Muslims.
246
 Hassan Hattab and the GSPC outlived the GIA, but 
both groups had become too weak to fight the Algerian government.
247
 At this point the GSPC 
sought the support of Al Qaeda (AQ) central-- as it could no longer publicly support the GIA-- 
until 2003, when Hattab was replaced by Abu Ibrahim Mustafa after it was discovered that 
Hattab was considering reconciliation plans with the Algerian government.
248
  
 When Mustafa tried to join the GSPC up with AQ central, AQ was concerned that the 
GSPC was more interested with their local insurgency than the international goals of AQ 
central.
249
 This is a turning point as we see GSPC transition to the second phase of the AQIM 
evolution by formally joining forces with AQ central. The catalyst for this transition was GSPC 
sending soldiers to assist and fight for AQ Iraq.
250
 After committing troops and pledging 
allegiance to Osama Bin Laden, the new leader of GSPC Nabil Sahraoui Abdelmalek Droukdel 
began to echo AQ central sentiments regarding the more international goals by expanding 
operations in the Sahel region and taking on criminal activity, including contraband smuggling 
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 In 2007 the GSPC formally renamed itself Al Qaida in the lands of the 
Islamic Maghreb and had taken on the task of fighting the “far enemy” of the West or western 
styled states. In the immediate and proximal context for AQIM this meant retaking Spain, which 
they call “our country,” and waging war with France.
252
 In its current iteration, the organization 
is dedicated to transnational crime and local insurgency in Algeria, as well as attacking Western 
targets and destabilizing the entire Sahel region. It is also important to note that while the GSPC 
and Hattab sought the support of the people, AQIM does not depend on popular support of the 
people, nor do they support inclusion of Islamist parties in the political process, as it would 
undermine the resentment that can lead to recruitment for their organization.
253
 
 This change in strategic or objective goals is significant as officially joining AQ central 
had another profound effect on AQIM in the discipline of tactics. One of the metrics used to 
determine the seriousness of the AQIM-AQ Central connection, which has been questioned as 
little more than an ethereal association, is by looking at the clear evolution in tactics by AQIM 
since pledging allegiance to AQ central.  Not only has there been an evolution in tactics, but also 
a mirroring of AQ central tactics used in other theaters of insurgency and war. The most notable 
and definitive change in tactics is the use of suicide bombers and, more specifically, suicide car 
bombers in conjunction with immediate media releases and press releases to claim both 
responsibility for the attack and martyrdom for the bomber.
254
  
 Along with suicide bombing, IED and cell phone triggered attacks are being utilized by 
AQIM, which was undoubtedly a skill learned by the combatants they sent to fight alongside AQ 
Iraq against coalition forces. Two even more worrisome tactics have also become part of the 
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AQIM playbook. The first is the use of complex coordinated car bomb attacks that create chaos 
and uncertainty, which can serve to destabilize the proximal area with great immediacy. On 
February 13, 2007, seven car bombs were detonated at the same time outside of northern 
Algerian police headquarters. In April 2007 a three-suicide bomber coordinated attack killed 33 
in Algiers.
255
 The other troublesome tactic that AQIM now employs is the targeting of “hard” 
and powerful targets, which require comprehensive planning and sophisticated weapons and are 
also a re-creation of AQ tactics around the world. In July of 2007, a truck bomb killed eight at an 
army post, and on December 11, 2007, AQIM attacked U.N. and Algerian government buildings 
with what they claim was an 1800-pound car bomb.
256
 These attacks against powerful and well 
defended structures is disconcerting in that we see a more daring, coordinated, and lethal AQIM, 
more in line with AQ central tactics. In the same light, by choosing to attack the U.N. it is a clear 
message of AQIM aspirations to start working on the international stage, which only serves to 
solidify their allegiance and connection to AQ central.  
 From the GIA, to GSPC, to AQIM, the group has evolved from a state insurgency 
movement to a focused and incredibly lethal regional terrorist organization that is now part of a 
larger jihadi network. AQIM in its current state, or the final phase, is not one single entity that 
fights uniformly, but is in fact made up of smaller splinter groups that have their own distinctions 
and local goals, and can even be combative amongst each other all while under the AQIM 
banner.
257
 The following is a brief breakdown of these splinter groups:  
 The Masked Battalion: Led by In-Amenas mastermind Mokhtar Belmokhtar 
(AKA the Marlboro Man). He is one of the more recognizable and ruthless 
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leaders in the Islamist terrorist movement in Africa. This group is the oldest 
and most informed when it comes to desert routes, which allows them to 
operate successful contraband and smuggling rings that can finance terrorist 
activities.  
 The al-Furqan Squadron: Led by Yahya Abu al-Hamam. This squadron is 
known to be the most hostile and predatory in recent years. With many 
members coming from Mauritania, it is of no surprise that many of their 
clashes have been with the Mauritanian army.  
 The Tariq ibn Ziyad Battalion: Led by Abdel Hamid Abu Zayd. They are 
considered the most radical and fundamentalist of the AQIM splinter groups. 




The following two groups are not directly part of AQIM, but are active in the 
region:  
 Haraket al-Tawhid wa al-jihad fi Gharb Afriqiya: Led by Sultan al-Azawadi 
and Hamada Ould Mohamed. This group is predominantly made up of 
disenfranchised rebels from the three other groups. It should be noted that 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar has supposedly joined forces with this group to create 
Al-Mourabitoun and that their goal is concentrated attacks on France.
259
 
                                                        
258 Mohamed Salem Ould Mohamed, “Purist Salafism in the Sahel and Its Position on the Jihadist Map,”  
Al Jazeera Center For Studies. 
259 “AQIM break-aways ‘merge,’ threaten French interests,” TVC NEWS, http://www.tvcnews.tv/?q=article/aqim-break-aways-




 Jama a’at Ansar al-Din: Led by Iyad Ag Ghali. This group actively tries to 




From this brief historical analysis there is a good understanding of AQIM and its roots. From its 
start as a local insurgency as the GIA and a major player in the bloody Algerian civil war where 
civilian massacres were acceptable, evolving into the GSPC, which moved away from civilian 
attacks, and finally, the transformation into AQ central affiliate. In this form there is a return to 
terrorist tactics and, more importantly, tactics learned and in-line with AQ central, but also a 
fractious and divided dynamic among competing groups under the same banner.  
Western Interests 
  Both “Western” and “interests” can be considered vague terms, so it would be 
advantageous to better define them as we seek to see if they are in fact threatened by AQIM. 
When this paper uses the term Western it is referring to any states that hold certain values as part 
of their system. These values would include a representative democracy, capitalism, freedom of 
religion, basic human rights, and the embodiment of social, cultural, and political pluralism or 
syncretism. In this context “Western” does not have any actual geographic connotations. Of 
course there will be varying degrees of satisfying these principles, but a good metric would be to 
look at the countries that are members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Union (EU), as both organizations require many of the aspects listed above to consider 
a nation for membership.  
   For the sake of this paper, “interests” cover a litany of practices, investments, resources 
and more. The best way to define them would be to break them into groups. Natural resources 
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like oil, precious metals, and minerals are all natural resource interests. From a national security 
viewpoint military bases (both a country’s own and a foreign nation’s bases), embassies, and law 
enforcement agencies can be considered an interest. From an economic perspective property, 
ports, airports, businesses, infrastructure and even trade policy can be an interest. Another 
interest is people themselves, so we can count expatriates as well as members of another country 
that have a connection or bond that is of great importance in some bilateral or developmental 
facet like an NGO worker for example.  
 In short, an interest can be anything from a tangible property, ideology, or policy, to a 
liaison with a foreign government agency. Anything that is of important concern or significance 
to a nation is an interest. While this is a very broad definition of “interests” it is not for a lack of 
focus, but because the complexity and comprehensive nature of what can be important should 
not be relegated to only a very specific set, but in fact should be kept as wide as possible when 
looking at threats as it will become apparent that the terrorist threat can have harm so many 
elements of a state. 
 In this situation it should be understood that there are critical opinions of the U.S. and its 
counterterrorism (CT) initiatives in Africa. Critics find that CT operations by France and the 
U.S. may be a façade or cover for the Unite States to secure natural resources and to contain 
China on the African continent. There is evidence of this as the U.S. concern on this issue is 
apparent in Secretary Kerry’s Senate confirmation hearing:   
Now with respect to China and Africa, China is all over Africa- I mean, all over 




it, and there’re some places where we’re not in the game, folks. And I hate to say 
it. And we got to get in.”
261
 
  There should be a distinction made at this juncture. International CT operations should of 
course not serve as a cover for any kind of resources “grab” or be motivated by diplomatic 
competition. At the same time it is reasonable that countries would want to protect investments 
and interests abroad and this is acceptable. While there is clearly a competition between China 
and the U.S. all over the globe for resources and trade opportunities it appears to be a stretch that 
this is the main motivation for CT operations in Africa when we discover the various threats and 
insurgency groups employing terrorism tactics in the Sahel region alone.  
Globalization  
 Entire papers attempt to define globalization, but in this case Charles Oman’s definition 
found within the “The Policy Challenges of Globalization and Regionalization” paper is apt:  
Globalization is the growth, or more precisely the accelerated growth, of 
economic activity across national and regional political boundaries. It finds 
expression in the increased movement of tangible and intangible goods and 
services, including ownership rights, via trade and investment, and often of 
people, via migration. It can be and often is facilitated by a lowering of 
government impediments to that movement, and/or by technological progress, 
notably in transportation and communications. The actions of individual 
economic actors, firms, banks, people, drive it, usually in the pursuit of profit, 
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often spurred by the pressures of competition. Globalization is thus a centrifugal 
process, a process of economic outreach, and a microeconomic phenomenon.
262
 
 Globalization is an important part of the Sahel region and one of the best chances for its 
success. The region is made up of many fragile and developing states and one of the best ways 
for them to develop is through trade, emigration and immigration, foreign investments, and a 
multitude of other initiatives that add to the economic growth and integration into the 
international community. When terrorism has a stranglehold of an area it makes it harder for 
globalization and development to occur in two ways. In the immediacy of a terror event there is 
usually damage to infrastructure, which of course damages trade and development ability, but 
after the fact, there is a psychological effect that can serve to frighten away would-be investors, 
developers, and trade partners. 
Threats 
 With finite definitions for the interests that are at stake it will now be possible to 
accurately define how AQIM can threaten these interests. When thinking of a threat the classic 
definitions are apt: 
 A statement of an intention to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other hostile 
action on someone in retribution for something done or not done 
 A person or thing likely to cause damage or danger263 
 
 When using this classic definition it may seem a matter of simply combining or assessing 
whether or not AQIM is a threat to Western Interests. This is not the case. When looking at 
threats we must measure them on a spectrum, and this is where the complexity of the matter 
comes to hand. It is impossible to measure the threat as a black and white or yes/no issue. If 
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analyzed in this way it would be of little to no help to a policy or decision maker. For the sake of 
argument one could say any scenario could pose some threat. While unlikely, there is a chance 
that Russia could choose to attempt to take over all of Ukraine and certain neighboring ex-Soviet 
bloc states. This of course is a somewhat outrageous prospect, but one could argue that it is 
impossible to say that there is no threat of this occurring. A more accurate description would be 
that this is a nominal or inconsiderable threat. This is an extreme example, but it should serve as 
a basis that in the context of this paper there are no definite answers of yes or no, and that every 




Section II: Contextualizing and Analyzing the AQIM Threat 
AQIM as a Threat to the Sahel Region  
 
  The Sahel region in Africa is a belt of land that expands from the Atlantic Ocean to the 
Red sea and sits south of the Sahara desert and above the Sudanian Savannah. In the context of 
this paper, the region includes the countries of Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, The Gambia, Burkina 
Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad, as well as Algeria, despite the fact that it is not technically in the 
Sahel region, but is the home or root of AQIM. This region faces not only terrorist threats, but 
also environmental hardships as well due to desertification or the increasing arid nature of the 
environment, which is drying up bodies of water and thus destroying vegetation and wildlife. 
 The greatest issue facing the Sahel region is the fragility of the majority of states. 
Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt-- all bordering and intimately tied to the Sahel region-- all overthrew a 
dictator in 2011 (Egypt again in 2013). And while these dictators are considered to be nefarious 
at best, at the same time their iron or restrictive rule did lend stability to the region. In the Sahel 
itself, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad can be considered fragile states. Mali has 
undergone a coup and then a revolutionary war by Taureg rebels aided by AQIM fighters, which 
saw the town of Konna- only 600 KM from the Malian capital- captured.
264
 The rebels were so 
successful that the assistance of French and African Union troops became necessary to quell the 
rebellion. In Niger, Boko Haram is an insurgent group that resorts to terrorist activities such as 
bombing Christian and government facilities in addition to kidnappings and assassinations.
265
 
 So how is AQIM a threat to the region? To answer this question it is critical to consider 
that AQIM serves as a threat in different ways in different parts of the region and in all these 
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facilities it serves to destabilize the region. The natural starting point would be to look at Algeria, 
AQIM’s birth country, and understand that while more global in their efforts, the struggle to 
overthrow the secular government of Algeria remains, and consequently keeps Algeria in a state 
of civil war. AQIM also destabilizes Algeria and the majority of the countries in the Sahel 
though smuggling, supporting rebellions, kidnapping and ransoming, training and collaborating 
with other local terrorist groups (Boko Haram), and mass casualty bombings.  
  Regarding AQIM smuggling efforts, on February 18, 2012 Algerian security forces 
discovered a cache of weapons that were being smuggled across the border, including shoulder-
fired missiles.
266
 These kinds of weapons are incredibly dangerous and can do sizeable damage 
and present a very serious threat. Smuggling does not just occur in Algeria, it is one of the main 
initiatives for AQIM as they run everything from cigarettes to humans across the region. In the 
Western Sahara AQIM continues to smuggle weapons, drugs, and contraband, which helps to 
destabilize these states.
267
 In Mauritania border security efforts must be increased to prevent 
kidnapping of foreigners and the smuggling of illegal immigrants.
268
 Additionally, AQIM is 
known for the smuggling of legal goods and benefiting from price differentials in different states, 
but there is also an alarming amount of evidence that they are now major players in the 
smuggling of drugs from South America. The Department of Homeland Security claims that the 
flying of drugs from South America to West Africa is the most significant exploitation of aircraft 
since 9/11.
269
 In 2010, three AQIM operatives were captured by DEA agents after attempting to 
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offer a smuggling route to Spain.
270
 The United Nations also estimates that between 50 to 100 
tons of cocaine makes its way to Europe from South America via West Africa annually.
271
  
 There is no evidence that all of this cocaine is transferred via AQIM, but according to a 
Reuters report the cocaine is flown into West Africa by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia People's Army (FARC) and is then transferred to Europe using AQIM smuggling 
routes. Looking at Figure 1, which diagrams the cocaine smuggling routes though West Africa 
combined with knowledge of AQIM’s control of West African smuggling routes and the other 
accounts of AQIM involvement, it is a logical conclusion that they play a large part in this 
operation.  
 Looking at the recent rebellion and land siege in Mali, 
AQIM fighters serve to keep this country in a state of flux and 
civil war as well. Despite the conclusion of major fighting in 
Mali, the situation remains tense in the state between the 
government, Taureg rebels, and AQIM. Even more alarming is 
suspected collusion between Malian state officials and AQIM, 
as the death of Malian Lieutenant Colonel Lamana Ould Bou is 




 Kidnapping and ransoming is also an important source of income for AQIM as the group 
engages in these acts all over the Sahel region. Since 2008 it is estimated that AQIM has made 
between 40 and 65 million dollars from ransoming in Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Niger, and 
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 In addition to providing immense funding to AQIM these kidnappings have also had 
other distinct negative effects. First, the tourism industries have suffered greatly, if not collapsed 
completely because of the fear of kidnapping. This creates even less legitimate job opportunities 
outside of criminal activity and a trickledown effect of destabilization based on this lack of job 
opportunities outside criminal endeavors. Secondly, when Western governments pay ransoms 
and convince Sahel nations to release prisoners to swap, it undermines that country’s national 




 AQIM further destabilizes the region by connecting with and supporting the other local 
terrorist groups in, or near, the Sahel region. This is most pertinent when it comes to terrorist 
organization Boko Haram in Nigeria. In a RAND report on AQIM there is mention of AQIM and 
Boko Haram working together to perpetrate kidnappings and roadside attacks.
275
 There is also 
evidence of Intelligence reports that put AQIM and Boko Haram together, and conducting joint 
training exercises. Boko Haram has now begun to exhibit the same evolved tactics that AQIM 
had started to use after joining up with AQ central.
276
 It is only logical that with evidence of joint 
training exercises coupled with Boko Haram’s evolution to AQIM tactics that AQIM should 
strongly be considered to be the catalyst for the increases in the lethality of Boko Haram attacks, 
thus furthering the destabilization of the region.    
 Since integrating with AQ central and adopting their tactics, most noticeably suicide and 
car bombs, the results have been horrific for the Sahel region. According to the Global Terrorism 
Database there have been 103 bombings in the Sahel region perpetrated by AQIM between 2007 
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and 2011, over the course of which 488 people were killed and 874 were injured.
277
 Like 
kidnappings, bombings serve to destabilize, but in addition to striking fear in foreigners and their 
investments they also physically destroy infrastructure, markets, and commerce, and create a 
collective psyche of fear and dread. All these factors only add more hurdles to development for 
these fragile states.   
 There are skeptics of the terrorist threat to the Sahel region. Charlie Warren makes the 
case that West Africa has not become an “international terrorist playground,” but in the same 
article only seems to draw upon evidence contrary to his theory. The picture his article paints is 
quite bleak with the detailing of a weapons market flush with Semtex explosives, Kalashnikovs, 
and man-portable-air-defense systems. Additionally, the article outlines the instable and fragile 
states, failure of counterterrorist initiatives, as well as the terrorism groups active in the region.
278
 
Even if we take Warren’s word in the semantic context that the Sahel has not become an 
“international terrorist playground,” this does little to combat the chaotic, dangerous and fragile 
situation that is occurring even if only at the hand of what Warren thinks are strictly local 
insurgencies.  
 The number of threats that AQIM causes in the region is numerous and runs the gamut 
from preventing economic development and resource development to attempted insurgencies 
against democratic states and the staging of bombings and suicide attacks. The sum of these 
different threats is that AQIM serves to severely debilitate and destabilize the Sahel region 
greatly. Figure 2 (following page) charts out a comprehensive visualization of how AQIM tactics 
are not only varied, but how they literally reach out and strangle the entire region.   
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 The reach of AQIM smuggling routes and the breadth of targeted attacks and 
assassination attempts, in addition to the assistance provided to Boko Haram in the South and 
Taureg rebellion in the center of the Sahel, paint a vivid picture on how much AQIM smothers 
the region. It stands to reason that out of any insurgency or terrorist group, AQIM poses the 
greatest threat to the Sahel region. Even their international agenda in reality wreaks more havoc 
in the Sahel itself as AQIM targets foreign interests and developments within the region. AQIM 
operates in variety of capacities, but all of the activities share the commonality that they serve to 
disrupt, disturb and create chaos in the Sahel region. There is no question that AQIM is not only 
a threat to the Sahel region, but this is where they are the most serious threat.  
AQIM as a Threat to Western Interests in Africa   
 AQIM is a serious threat to the Sahel region in a multitude of ways, but the threat does 
not end there. Currently there is great interest in developing and creating an advanced Africa. 




Africa, but investment and development brings jobs, infrastructure, and stability to otherwise 
fragile regions and states. These positive changes would be detrimental to the AQIM and AQ 
central mission. In chaotic and unstable conflict zones where there is little chance for legal work 
or opportunities to make a career or life, terrorism and insurgency groups become the best, if not 
only option, to survive and possibly make any money. This is most apparent with AQIM and 
their smuggling routes creating not only crime zones across the Sahel, but also enticing options 
to make money as a smuggler.  
 Outside of the practicality of creating chaos and a lack of options in the region, AQIM 
also has an ideological goal that sets its sights on Western interests. With its alliance to AQ 
central they must take part in the global jihad which they so far have done by attacking Western 
interests in the Sahel. This threat is very serious in nature. After an AQIM call-to-arms to attack 
all French interests around the world, President Francois Hollande of France responded by 
saying, “We are taking very seriously the threat from AQIM.”
279
 Pentagon Press Secretary 
George Little stated at a press briefing:  
AQIM poses a threat in the region (Sahel), and I can’t rule out the possibility that 
AQIM poses a threat to U.S. interests. This is a group that has shown its ability to 
demonstrate brutality and to conduct attacks.
280
 
 This concern coming from the Department of Defense is echoed by the Coordinator for 
the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State when he testified 
in front of The House Foreign Affairs Committee saying, “it is clear that AQIM poses a threat in 
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Mali and across the region.”
281
 Even former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton testified before 
Congress and showed concern for the threat AQIM poses to American and international security:  
This is going to be a very serious ongoing threat because if you look at the size of 
northern Mali, if you look at the topography, it's not only desert, it’s caves-- [it] 
sounds reminiscent... We are in for a struggle. But it is a necessary struggle. We 
cannot permit northern Mali to become a safe haven.
282
 
The threat is not only immediate for Western interests in the Sahel region, but there is concern 
for the possibility of Mali turning into the next Afghanistan in the context that it would be a 
sanctuary for AQIM and possibly AQ central or other associated terrorist groups.  
 U.S. and French leadership, among other Western nations, are concerned with AQIM and 
the threat it poses to their interests, but where exactly does the threat manifest itself in the 
region? Looking back at the threats to the Sahel section there are many devious tactics that any 
civil institution would find threatening, but at the same time there are two specific tactics that 
stand out as specific threats to Western interests as they are predominantly used against these 
interests. These two tactics are the kidnapping and ransoming of foreign nationals, and attacks 
targeting foreign properties, including government (both foreign and national) and international 
organizations.
 283
 It is through these two methods that AQIM poses the greatest threat to Western 
Interests.  
 According to the Global Terrorism Database, between AQIMs start in 2007 through 
2011, AQIM has kidnapped 47 foreign nationals (predominantly from Western states) from an 
array of disciplines including education, business, NGO, diplomatic, tourism, and the 
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 This time range does not account for 2003 when GSPC (the precursor to AQIM) 
kidnapped 32 foreign national tourists in Algeria.
285
  
 Kidnapping is so predominant because it in actuality fulfills both local and international 
mission statements while also serving to fund AQIM with significant ransom payments. The 
motive to kidnap will remain as long as ransom payments are made and they fulfill the missions 
of both AQIM and AQ central. This continuance of the tactic creates a serious threat for Western 
interests in two ways. First, the people of a country are part of the country’s interest. A country is 
nothing without its people and the state will try to protect them as much as possible. It is a great 
psychological blow for a state to not be able to keep their people safe even when they are abroad. 
This psychological aspect is many times overlooked because it is not as quantifiable, but still 
necessary to respect. The second aspect is if foreign nationals are not able to conduct business or 
engage via NGOs and civil society in the region then it is also a threat to Western interests as it is 
limiting the ability for that country’s people to operate in that country and produce business, 
trade, and diplomacy efforts.  
 Attacks that are targeted at Western property interests are similar to kidnappings in that 
they hurt Western interests by making it harder to operate in the country. While kidnapping and 
ransoming may create a more human or psychological toll for Western states, targeted attacks 
and specifically bombings can create sizeable financial costs with the destruction of property and 
valuable or critical infrastructure. The In-Amenas gas plant raid described in the introduction of 
this chapter is one example of these kinds of attacks, but unfortunately only one of many in the 
recent past. In 2013, two mines run by the French nuclear group Areva were struck by suicide 
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bombers followed by gunmen in cars, causing at least 13 injuries and 10 casualties.
286
 An attack 
that garnered more attention was the Westgate mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya. The Westgate mall 
is a symbol of Western ideology in its modernity and Western styled shops and products. During 
the attack Americans, French, British, Canadians, Chinese, Indians and nationals from many 
other states were victim to the siege.
287
 It should be noted that this attack was perpetrated by al-
Shabaab, but as they are closely connected with AQIM it should still serve as a reminder that 
these African terrorist groups do not need to actually attack the homeland of a state to attack its 
interests.  
 In December of 2006 AQIM attacked a bus carrying foreign employees of Brown, Root, 
and Condor, and in March of 2007 a Russian contractor working for Stroytransgaz was attacked. 
In 2008, gunmen attacked the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, in June a French 
engineer was murdered, and in August a bus was bombed, killing 12 employees of a Canadian 
aid organization.
288
 All of these attacks are examples of strikes against Western interests. The 
most indicative of AQIM global ambitions and intent to threaten Western interests is the 
bombing of U.N. and Algerian government facilities with a supposed 1800-pound vehicle bomb 
on December 11, 2007.
289
 With these attacks and bombings the message is clear that these are to 
threaten foreign and specifically Western interests in the region.  
 The threat to Western interests is incredibly high. The threat is not as serious as the threat 
to the Sahel region itself, but it is close, and it stands to reason that this region is possibly one of 
the most hazardous and dangerous places in the world for Western and foreign nationals to 
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operate. Between kidnappings and targeted attacks focused directly at foreigners and specifically 
Western foreigners or interests, it is clear that the threat level is both high and serious in the 
Sahel region.  
AQIM as a Threat to Europe 
 Before addressing AQIM as a threat to Europe it should be noted that there is distinction 
between the threat AQIM poses to “Western Interests in Africa” and the following section on 
Europe. While European nations claim ownership to many of these interests, at the same time 
they are geographically located in Africa. This section deals specifically with the threat posed to 
Europe as a continent and not interests abroad. 
  To date AQIM has not committed a terrorist attack on European soil, but this doesn’t 
mean that the threat doesn’t exist or that they are not active on European soil. The threat is not as 
serious as it is in the Sahel region, but research indicates AQIM is already operating in Europe to 
some degree. AQIM is already running funding operations out of Europe. Despite this, Critics 
like Christina Hellmich posit that the AQIM message of global jihad is nothing more than “flag-
waving” and that AQIM focuses more on the “near enemy” than AQ central’s cause.
290
 Hellmich 
sees the European threat as overblown and that AQIM is more concerned with overthrowing the 
Algerian government than the AQ central mission of global jihad.
291
 There is evidence to the 
contrary that points to an AQIM that is actively engaged in operations to attack the European 
homeland.
292
 Hellmich also misconstrues the fractious or non-cohesive nature of Al Qaeda and 
its local affiliates as evidence that they do not post a European or global threat.
293
 Even with a 
fractious or contentious dynamic this does not give proof that these separate groups would not 
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focus on European or Global targets, just that they might not collaborate. Furthermore, because 
hostage taking is not a core AQ central component and AQIM uses this tactic consistently, 
Hellmich sees this as evidence of discordance between AQIM and AQ central. There is the 
possibility that Hellmich is not contextualizing the situation correctly. AQIM has adopted many 
of AQ central’s tactics, but at the same time kidnapping for AQIM is a successful tool not only 
to make money, but also in threatening or more accurately “terrorizing” Western and 
international interests. Just because AQ central does not use this tactic does not mean that AQIM 
is not employing it to further the international cause along with the financial gain it brings. When 
contextualizing kidnapping as a useful tactic that works specifically well in the Sahel region, we 
can find fault in Helmich’s argument of discordance.  
There have been terrorist attacks in Europe, including the 7/7 attacks on the London 
public transportation system as well as the Madrid train bombing in 2004, but there has not been 
an attack on European soil that can be specifically attributed to AQIM, but there is evidence that 
it is not a matter of interest or motives, just capability which counters Helmich’s argument that 
AQIM is not interested in Europe, but rather providing “lip service” to the AQ central.   
 Specifically when it comes to Europe, Spain and France appear to be the main targets of 
AQIM. AQIM considers Spain “our country” and they have formally declared war on France.
294
 
In 2000, arrests in Italy, France, and Spain broke up three operational AQIM cells that were 
targeting a French market to bomb. Analysts also predict that there are over 5,000 AQIM 
supporters and an estimated 500 dedicated cell members in the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, Spain, and Italy.
295
 Furthermore, a suspected AQIM safe house is France was raided 
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where goggles, global positioning systems, and weapons-making equipment were all seized.
296
 
 Another cause for concern is the ability for people to travel between European Union 
states without as many border patrol measures. Once a terrorist or criminal gets into the EU, it is 
much easier for them to travel freely among the EU states, thus making operations easier to 
execute. In 2000, a GSPC (precursor to AQIM) cell was arrested in Italy with plans to blow up 
the U.S. embassy in Rome. In December 2005, AQIM operatives were arrested in Italy while 
planning to attack the U.S. homeland.
297
 These are just a handful of operations that have been 
caught and exhibit the motive AQIM has to attack on European soil or outside of the Sahel 
region writ large.  
 When exploring this threat the motive should be evaluated to gauge the seriousness and 
potential of an attack. Attacking Europe is a complex issue for AQIM, with strategic and 
psychological factors pushing for and against such attacks. From a psychological standpoint, 
AQIM has a hatred for European states with roots in the colonial imperialism that dominated and 
helped create many of the issues in the region. This hatred has only deepened with Western 
interests contradicting and competing with Sharia law in their homeland. They view themselves 
as revolutionaries and freedom fighters fighting to save their country. In this light, striking at the 
very heart of these colonial aggressors and foreign influencers would bring great pride an honor 
to the group. From the strategic standpoint AQIM can garner more publicity, relevance, and 
attention with an attack on European soil, and they will also gain notoriety and more credibility 
within the AQ leadership and the network itself.  
 Strategic concerns provide perhaps the most important factors as to why AQIM would 
not attack Europe. At its heart, AQIM is still a largely local or regional insurgency with AQ 
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central connections. So far, attacking Western interests within their own region seems to satisfy 
AQ central, while not bringing European forces and military resources to the region. Outside of 
the full-scale war and Mali’s request for assistance, European forces have not attacked AQIM to 
the degree they most likely would if terrorist attacks started to occur on European soil. 
 Operationally it is also easier to have successful attacks in their own theater than in 
Europe. Remembering that AQIM is a local or regional insurgency first, and that attacking 
Western interests in the region also supports their local cause at the same time, European targets 
do not appear as important. It would also stand to reason that AQIM would not let their 
international agenda get in the way of their local goals if it meant bringing European forces to 
their region and likely interference with their local goals.  
 Arrests across Europe as well as estimated numbers of AQIM supporters and actual cell 
members prove that Europe is a target of AQIM, but the extent of which it is a target and the 
capability of AQIM are in question. As there has not been an attack yet, despite numerous plots 
and arrests we can place the threat as a real probability but at the same time not nearly as high a 
threat as in the Sahel. Because the threat exists and is evidenced by law enforcement arrests and 
attempted plots in Europe there should be a cautious evaluation of risk. Just because the threat is 
not as high as it is for the Sahel region and Western interests within it, does not mean there is 
still a credible level of threat in Europe. For every European arrest and CT victory it must be 
remembered that this was an active terrorist plot targeting to attack within the European 
continent itself.  
AQIM as a Threat to Globalization in the Sahel Region 
   Globalization stands as the best hope to help the many developing states that currently 




develop these nations through economic growth spurred by international trade and investments. 
It can also help them develop by investing NGO and civil society projects as well as government 
agency investments in development, and inter-governmental participation in law enforcement 
and national security practices. Culturally there is an exchange of people, ideas and services that 
can also help to develop struggling countries. On the granular, but perhaps most important level, 
globalization brings the promises of hope in the form of jobs, education, and the overall chance 
for the people of a nation to make a better life for themselves.  
 All these reasons are why globalization is an enemy of AQIM and global jihad, besides 
being a process of integration into Western ideals in many cases. Anything that makes a country 
more stable, productive, and prosperous is the enemy of AQIM and global jihad because it 
makes it harder for them to recruit and create chaos which allows them to flourish. AQIM 
depends on unstable governments that do not have full control of their states, borders, and a lack 
of overall agency in the region to thrive.  
 Unfortunately, globalization is susceptible to terrorism. The threat to globalization in fact 
is really a summation of this chapter’s first two sections. For globalization to be successful states 
must be at least somewhat in control and the interests of the international community must be 
able to thrive in that nation. This is a major issue as the region is incredibly unstable and most 
states are fragile and find it difficult to protect these interests in large part due to AQIM efforts. 
 As analyzed, AQIM has made it very dangerous for Western or international interests 
within the region as well. With the threats to destabilization and Western interest in the region so 
high this means that globalization efforts in the Sahel are incredibly difficult tasks. The threat is 
not as severe as it is to the region itself or Western interests within the region, but the threat is 




Section III: Conclusion 
 
 The goal of this research paper is to inform the reader about AQIM and answer the 
question: To what degree is AQIM a threat? This paper finds that AQIM is a serious threat in 
many ways, but at the same time, this case is not a black and white issue. The idea of AQIM as a 
threat is existential in that for each entity it can be perceived differently. For instance, some 
might say that because there has not been an AQIM attack on the European continent, there is 
little to no threat. This paper looked to the litany of arrests and foiled plots as both successes in 
law enforcement and anti-terror efforts, but also as evidence of attempts to attack on European 
soil and therefore, supporting evidence that AQIM is a credible threat on the European continent. 
 While it is impossible to quantify or put an exact scientific metric on the threat AQIM 
poses to the Sahel, Western interests, and globalization, the object of this paper was to 
demonstrate that through its terrorist tactics and connection to AQ central the AQIM threat is a 
credible and serious one. There should also be great concern with the evidence of AQIM using 
suicide, IED, and vehicle bomb tactics as well as the alarming amount of arrests of AQIM cells 
and foiled plots in Europe. All of this evidence supports the theory that AQIM is becoming more 
of a threat to not only the Sahel region, but on a more global scale.  
 AQIM is a threat, a threat that will continue as long as the group exists. They will evolve 
and adapt and may even change their name or tactics, but as long as their core tactic is terrorism 
they will continue to be a threat. Their threat is the most extreme in the Sahel region itself. Even 
a break with AQ central would mean that their activities in the Sahel region would continue to 
disrupt and destabilize the region. AQIM is also a serious threat to Western interests in the 
region as well. While not as high as the threat to the region itself, the only way there may be a 




local aspirations to overthrow the Algerian, or other local governments. This possible, although 
unlikely, change in targeting or strategy could lead to a loss of interest or a drop in prioritization 
from the international community, which would serve to take the international CT and law 
enforcement focus off of AQIM allowing for more freedom to focus on their local insurgent 
goals.   
 This “drop in Western targeting to avoid international attention theory” would depend on 
whether attacks not specifically targeting Western interests still did damage to these interests and 
how serious those damages were. The AQIM threat in Europe is not as serious as the Sahel 
region or Western interests within it, but at the same time the evidence of attempted plots, 
declared aspirations, and the proximity to the region make the threat a credible one that should 
still be taken seriously. Both the destabilization of the region and the targeting of Western and 
international interests in the region are a threat to globalization as an idea and as an effort. This 
threat will continue to be measured by the actions of AQIM in the region and against those 
international interests. At this current time the threat is high as AQIM has been successful in 
both these missions. AQIM is a menace to freedom, advancement, and development in Africa 
and specifically the Sahel region, but hopefully with holistic counter-terrorism measures, law 
enforcement and military action, and an engaged international response, AQIM can eventually 






 It was not until the end of Thesis II that a more concrete unifier for the three chapters 
manifested. At this point it was clear that Chapter I looked into the past with the development of 
the counter-terrorism narrative, Chapter II looked at the present issues with UAV policy, and 
Chapter III analyzed the threat that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had on the Sahel 
region- or looking into the future. This chronological connection made sense and seemed like a 
structurally sound way to organize the paper. And while it does still hold true, Professor 
Benjamin Ginsberg found a more organic and representative unifying theme compared to the 
previously discovered chronological connection that had serendipitously been created.  
 Professor Ginsberg saw a theme of studying the counter-terrorism and terrorism narrative 
from a macro, mid, and micro level of contextualization. Chapter I creates a large-scale or 
“macro” investigation into the American collective consciousness as a whole. Chapter II takes a 
“mid” level critical perspective on a specific tool (UAVs) of the counter-terrorism strategy, and 
gives policy recommendations that should make said tool fit better into the overall counter-
terrorism strategy. Chapter III gives a “micro” perspective by focusing not on Al Qaeda, but 
instead on a local insurgent group in the Sahel region that bears the Al Qaeda name or brand.  
While the temporal connection is accurate, and still exists, this examination with of 
varying scope (macro, mid, micro) gives a comprehensive view of the counter-terrorism 
narrative and how it can affect so many different aspects of society, geography, and policy. With 
this unifying theme, this thesis should conclude with a general sense of what has been learned in 
answering the specific goal of the research question posed, and give the reader a broad 





Chapter I: The Fallacy of the Global War on Terrorism and The American Culture of Defeat 
 This Chapter examined the effect the 9/11 attacks had on the U.S collective 
consciousness and policy. Section one analyzed the United States post-9/11 as a modern version 
of the “Culture of Defeat” contextualized by how the United States not only responded to the 
9/11 attacks in a romantic or emotional fashion, but also how as a collective the American public 
was so easily manipulated or influenced by the false rhetoric put forth by the Bush 
administration.  
 Section two explored the detrimental effects that the GWOT narrative had on both the 
American collective consciousness by creating an anxious, Islamophobic, and unappeasable 
public consciousness, as well true counter-terrorism initiatives in Afghanistan, by diverting 
resources to the war in Iraq. The most topical example of the detriment to CT initiatives would 
be the power vacuum in Iraq created by the U.S. invasion and then withdrawal, which left a weak 
state that is now in midst of a war with ISIL- a terrorist organization that now controls major 
geographic territory in Iraq.  
 Another significant lesson learned is the idea of the GWOT narrative as a sort of fairytale 
in styling of the “us-vs.-them” narrative that was inspired by the Bush administration. In 
retrospect it makes sense that this fairytale-like story was provided to the public because it was a 
simple and engaging way to sell the GWOT plan. An epic battle between good and evil or our 
way of life vs. some “foreign force” was a much easier sell than the true complexity of the 
situation. What was not planned is how the narrative escaped the parameters of the initial 
motives to drum up support for the GWOT initiative and took on a life of its own. In this form it 
created an anxious and depressed public that turned on the Bush administration when it became 




Iraq started to claim more American lives and the threat of terrorism at home and abroad did not 
appear to cease.  
 After completing this chapter and looking back it would be helpful to have more in-depth 
analysis into how the GWOT narrative has hurt the counter-terrorism measures with a focus on a 
breakdown of diverted military resources, spending, and strategic and intelligence elements. 
Additionally, while there has been some research on this topic, it would also be advantageous to 
see more research into the role the media played in carrying out the GWOT narrative to the 
American public and what affect it had on the American collective consciousness both 
immediately after the 9/11 attacks and also in the long term.  
Chapter II: Recommendations for The Evolution of American UAV Policy 
Chapter II posed the question of how to make UAVs a better overall tool in countering 
terrorism. The research proved that UAVs play, and will continue to play, an integral part in the 
American counter-terrorism strategy, but only time will tell whether it ultimately becomes a 
detrimental hindrance or if it can become a more useful tool that is coordinated within the larger 
counter-terrorism strategy. In this light there is clearly a need to balance immediate national 
security concerns and goals with long-term objectives.  
It is my conclusion that much reform is necessary with regard to UAV policy, strategy, 
and tactics to better coordinate within the larger counter-terrorism strategy as well as to create 
credibility and norms with the domestic and international community. Moving forward, it is 
imperative that the United States acts quickly, as the period where they have the dominant 
control and influence over UAV technology and use is at its apex. Now is the time when U.S. 




occur to ensure that UAVs become a successful tool in countering terrorism, and violent 
extremism, and not a dangerous hindrance to these causes.   
While potentially dangerous, it would be invaluable to have more empirical research to 
see the effects that UAV strikes have on local populaces so as to better determine the effect on 
the larger counter-terrorism strategy. From a more risk adverse perspective it would be a positive 
step to see more research into what the United States can do in the international engagement 
realm to better create support, norms, and credibility for their UAV program. This would be 
especially true with regard to changing the narrative where UAV strikes occur and with the 
people that are the most affected.     
Chapter III: Al Qaeda in The Islamic Maghreb: A Threat Analysis 
 In this chapter the main results of the threat analysis were that AQIM is a threat to 
varying degrees on the interests studied. The research found that the highest threat is to the Sahel 
region itself and Western interests within the region. As a product of such a high threat to the 
aforementioned elements globalization is also threatened to an extraordinary degree. While 
Europe is threatened to a lesser degree the evidence of plots and arrests show that there is still a 
threat that must be respected.  
Additionally, there were two important takeaways from the research outside of answering 
the thesis question, which was to determine the threat AQIM poses on the Sahel region, Western 
interests within it, and Europe. First was deconstructing AQIM and realizing that even at the 
regional level there can be fractious and competing groups that struggle against each other. In 
this context it should hopefully inform the reader that when making mention of Al Qaeda or a 




the precise groups that are in reality to be blamed. This more focused critical lens should help 
create better counter-terrorism policy that can address a specific group.  
Another discovery via research was the fact that AQIM engages in criminal activity 
almost as much if not more than terrorist activities. Smuggling, ransoming, and the selling of 
contraband make up a majority of the day-to-day operations for AQIM. While these tactics may 
not be classically terrorist endeavors, they still serve to destabilize a state or region. Because 
these acts are more prevalent, it may even stand to say that AQIM’s criminal acts destabilize the 
region more than their terrorist acts do. It is possible that a different approach should be taken 
against these local factions that are more representative of ant-criminal or mafia initiatives that 
will disrupt their criminal and moneymaking enterprises that also serve to destabilize the region.  
The discoveries made in this chapter opened up more questions that need serious research 
to help better U.S. counter-terrorism strategy. Research needs to focus on how to create better 
environments and microenvironments through countering violent extremism efforts to stop and 
contain the influence of these local insurgencies. Additionally, there should also be more 
research into the possibility or effect of treating these local insurgencies as criminal syndicates as 
a way to combat them.  
Conclusion 
This thesis seeks to create a better understanding of the complexities of the counter-
terrorism dynamic, as well as continue the pursuit to create a more informed public on counter-
terrorism issues.  
There are also more direct conclusions or recommendations that can be drawn from the 
research. There needs to be an increase in understanding and knowledge on the subject both for 




the right direction, but moving forward, policymakers and leaders need to work harder to present 
an accurate and factual representation of the counter-terrorism situation. The narrative should be 
non-fiction, it should be realistic, and it should treat the public as an intelligent collective that 
will be better served by the complex reality as opposed to a simplified fictitious construct.  
The one-dimensional but unrealistic nature of the GWOT narrative is an example of how 
a simple but inaccurate fiction can work to gain support in the beginning, but in the end will have 
disastrous results when expectations cannot be met. From a different perspective, subject matter 
experts need to constantly increase their knowledge of terrorist organizations as the more that is 
learned, the better the chance to devise policy that will be effective. A good example of this 
would be the realization through research that even within AQIM there is a fractious and 
conflicting nature among smaller groups, which could be used to combat the AQIM organization 
on a larger scale.  
From a military perspective it is clear that UAV technology is the sharp point of the 
sword, but one that the United States needs to make sure only has one edge. It is vital to 
acknowledge the significance of the UAV program and how the current technology already 
serves in targeting and killing serious terrorist actors and threats with the secondary effect of not 
risking American lives. Both these qualities cannot be understated and should be appreciated. At 
the same time, it is clear that UAV technology policy must evolve so that it can continue to be 
successful in taking out serious high value targets while not strengthening local support and 
recruitment for terrorist organizations, which undermines larger counter-terrorism efforts that 
look to change the heroic insurgent narrative as well as the systemic environments that allow 




From a large-scale policy perspective, the United States needs to work on creating better 
practices and norms in the field of counter-terrorism. A large part of the counter-terrorism 
dynamic is global perception and how a group or a state appears to be acting in accordance with 
international standards, a country’s own laws, and an admittedly vague set of international 
morals. The United States needs to create clarity, oversight, and transparency wherever possible, 
but especially regarding UAV technology, to create norms for the domestic public as well as the 
international community to lift the curtain that allows for uninformed judgment and in extreme 
cases perverse fantasy regarding U.S. actions to counter-terrorist organizations.  
In finishing this thesis the reader should have a better understanding of the complexities 
that make up the counter-terrorism and terrorism dynamic. If anything, there should be a 
realization that there is rarely, if ever, a straightforward answer or simple solution to the issues 
that arise within this dynamic. This complexity may seem fatalist or insurmountable, but that is 
not the case. It is simply motivation for scholars and experts to continue their pursuit to inform 
themselves, policymakers, and the public. With this pursuit the United States and world will 
profit from informed evolution, adaptation, and an understanding of the past that informs the 
present. With this knowledge there will be an enhanced comprehension of the complexities of 
the counter-terrorism narrative, and the possibility for a better approach to navigate within this 
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